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ABSTRACT 
 
Plato’s Lysis and Its Influence on Kant and Aristotle.  
(August  2008) 
Michael Oviedo, B.A., Gonzaga University 
Chair of Advisory Committee: Dr. Scott Austin 
 
Most scholarship concerning Plato’s Lysis focuses on the failure of Socrates’ 
elenchus in its endeavor to define friendship. However, this construal of the dialogue is 
shortsighted. If one analyzes the dialogue’s dramatic subtext then one will discover a 
fairly complete theory of friendship attributable to Plato. This issue is critical, for the 
Lysis is a significant influence on Aristotle’s ethical theory. Thus, unless one grasps the 
relationship between Aristotle’s ethical theory and this particular dialogue, then one 
could argue that one does not really understand Aristotle’s motivations regarding his 
usage of friendship as the defining normative force of his political community.  
 Similarly, understanding the Lysis is paramount to understanding Kant’s theory 
of friendship as well, for Kant can be interpreted as a virtue ethicist. And, analogous to 
other virtue ethicists such as Aristotle and Plato, Kant espouses a perspective on 
friendship, which utilizes friendship as the social cohesion of the moral community. 
However, unlike Plato and Aristotle who argue that friendship exists for the sake of the 
other person, Kant’s theory claims that one must participate in friendships for the sake of 
 iv
duty. This departure raises various issues regarding his understanding of friendship, for 
example, are friendships genuine?  
 For Kant, friendship enables those involved to gain a greater understanding of the 
moral law and nurture relationships which will facilitate that goal. In this respect, like 
good Aristotelians help one another attain eudaimonia, good Kantians help each other 
strive towards holiness. Hence, for Kant, the empirical facets of our relationships such as 
aspiring towards eudaimonia, are not as important as gaining a better understanding of 
the moral law. Thus, to whom the actions are geared does not matter; it is the actions 
themselves, which are important. In this respect, while the virtuous will genuinely desire 
to help their friend, they do not genuinely help their friend in the Ancient Greek sense, 
since their actions are performed for duty’s sake. Nevertheless, Kant introduces 
humanistic qualities to friendship, e.g. trust, respect, and self-disclosure, which advances 
its study into the present day.  
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1. INTRODUCTORY COMMENTS 
 
 Most scholarship concerning Plato’s Lysis focuses on the failure of Socrates’ 
elenchus in its endeavor to define friendship. However, as the second section will show, 
this interpretation of the dialogue is not complete, for it fails to gain an understanding of 
the dialogue’s dramatic subtext. As the next section will show, the dramatic subtext is 
where Plato’s suggests his theory of friendship. 
 If one analyzes the aporia in the Lysis’ final remarks, then one will encounter 
two seemingly different conclusions. On one hand, Socrates and the boys are unable to 
fashion a definition of friendship. In other words, they are unable to derive its first 
principle. On the other hand, Socrates states that the boys, through this process, would 
appear to others as friends. This comment suggests that Socrates possesses some 
understanding of what friendship is. However, if Socrates and the boys cannot define 
friendship, then how does friendship exist? 
 For Plato, friendship exists as an activity. It is the process of enhancing one’s 
wisdom, or understanding, through shared philosophical inquiry. This insight, however, 
is not original. As the section states, Aristide Tessitore surmises a similar conclusion.1 
Though, as section 2 will show, Tessitore’s assertion is cursory with respect to the depth 
of the dialogue, for while Tessitore states that friendship exists through philosophical 
                                                 
This thesis follows MLA style.  
 
1
 Aristide Tessitore, “Plato’s Lysis: An Introduction to Philosophic Friendship,” Southern Journal of 
Philosophy, 28 (1990): 127-28 
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activity, he fails to articulate Plato’s conception past this point. Hence, Section 2 aims to 
excavate further information from the dialogue itself. 
 From the dramatic subtext, one can extrapolate a theory of friendship, which is 
surprisingly similar to the one proffered by Aristotle. Firstly, if one connects Socrates to 
Hermes, then one will discover that Socrates’ role within the dialogue is to lead the boys 
on a journey and provide good advice so that the boys can successfully aspire to become 
“good.” If one applies this correlation to the characters, themselves, then one will 
discover the following relationships. First, one will see that erotic relationships between, 
for example, the affection that Hippothales possesses towards Lysis, while seeming 
genuine is actually self-interested. Next, if one examines the conclusion of Socrates’ 
argument concerning friendship and the good, which states that the good cannot be 
friends because they are self-sufficient, then one will see that there are two levels of self-
sufficiency. On one level, there is health (hence, the doctor example), and on the higher 
level, there is ‘the good’, which can only be reached through the pursuit of wisdom. 
Therefore, from this distinction one can deduce the friendship of usefulness and its 
consequent bifurcation into the friendships that desire higher goods such as virtue and 
friendships that maintain basic goods such as health. While striving for virtue is 
necessarily involved with the pursuit of the greatest happiness, the latter type is not. For 
example, one can be famous or wealthy and still not happy.  
 At this juncture, one might wonder what Socrates’ role within the dialogue is. 
We know that he represents Hermes but how does this allusion influence the dialogue. 
As Section 2 will show, there is a model that friendship follows: one befriends an 
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intermediary on account of the good to avoid the bad. Hence, one could make the 
argument that Socrates’ relationship to the boys is actually a civic friendship. If this is 
the case, then not only is Plato’s theory of friendship other-regarding in a similar vein to 
Aristotle’s, but Socrates’ friendship to the boys implies that the activity of friendship is 
the cohesion of the political community.  
 As Section Three will show Aristotle’s conception of friendship is the 
community. Normative forces originate from many community-based sources such as 
the ruler, other friends, the household, virtue, and so on. However, for Aristotle the 
ultimate catalyst to becoming a virtuous person and thereby leading a virtuous life is 
how one befriends oneself.  
 For Aristotle self-love is integral, for it is through one’s love for oneself that one 
becomes virtuous. This idea immediately suggests an ‘other-regard’, which as Section 2 
showed is not an easy task for one who desires to garner a conception of friendship from 
Plato’s dialogue.  
 Nevertheless, one significant difference for Aristotle is that he defines the state of 
friendship. Hence, it is no longer understood as just an activity. Aristotle, of course, is 
able to do this because he alters Plato’s Theory of Ideas. No longer would different 
understandings of what friendship is be forced into one universal first principle. Instead, 
the form of friendship, for Aristotle, becomes equivocal. This enables Aristotle to create 
his polymorphic view and classify more types of relationships as friendships. Thus, in 
Aristotle one now has the complete form (character-based friendship) and the two 
incomplete (pleasure-based and utility-based). Through the complete form one can 
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participate in philosophical activity to attain eudaimonia. As such, for Aristotle the 
absolutely good still require friends to maintain the perfect life.  
 Section 4 explicates Kant’s reaction to Plato’s and Aristotle’s respective views 
on friendship. First off, Section 4 explains Kant’s relationship to virtue ethics in that 
since his theory possesses many parallels to virtue ethics, to be charitable towards Kant 
one must realize that Kant is both a virtue ethicist and a deontologist. And, once that 
connection is established, the section can discuss Kant’s perspective on friendship, 
which, like Aristotle and Plato, utilizes friendship as the social cohesion of the moral 
community. However, unlike Plato and Aristotle who argue that friendship exists for the 
sake of the other person, Kant’s theory claims that one must participate in friendships for 
the sake of duty. This departure raises various issues regarding his understanding of 
friendship, for example, are friendships genuine?  
 For Kant, friendship fulfills a function. In other words, friendship enables those 
involved to gain a greater understanding of the moral law and nurture relationships, 
which will facilitate that goal. In this respect, like good Aristotelians help one another 
attain eudaimonia, good Kantians help each other strive towards holiness. Hence, for 
Kant, the empirical facets of our relationships such as aspiring towards eudaimonia, are 
not as important as gaining a better understanding of the moral law. Thus, to whom the 
actions are geared does not matter; it is the actions themselves, which are important. In 
this sense, while the virtuous will genuinely desire to help their friend, they do not 
genuinely help their friend in the Ancient Greek sense since their actions are performed 
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for duty’s sake. Nevertheless, Kant introduces humanistic qualities to friendship, e.g. 
trust, respect, and self-disclosure, which advances its study into the present day.  
Consequently, through this brief genealogy one will discover the evolution of a 
particular friendship paradigm with similar objectives; manifest itself through all three 
(Plato, Aristotle, and Kant) major thinkers. Thus, while Aristotle is the most prominent 
example of this view for it permeates his ethical theory, both Kant’s and Plato’s 
respective positions, which are analogous to Aristotle, should not be ignored. 
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2. PLATONIC FRIENDSHIP: A RE-EVALUATION OF THE LYSIS 
 
The Lysis takes place at a wrestling school during a festival honoring the god 
Hermes. Plato’s decision to use this particular setting is significant. Since Hermes is the 
god of gymnastic sports, e.g. wrestling, this allusion connotes a strong tie between 
Hermes and the dialogue. Furthermore, since Hermes is also the patron of wayfarers, and 
Socrates functions as a guide for the boys in this dialogue, there is also a connection 
between Hermes and Socrates. Hence, one can claim that Socrates guides the boys on 
their journey towards wisdom through the activity of philosophical friendship. Since the 
object of discussion is friendship, the philosophical activity in this dialogue aims at 
comprehending, and subsequently, articulating friendship’s first principle.2 However, as 
this section will show, while the dialogue explores many different conceptions of 
friendship through Socrates’ elenchus, the true theory of friendship lies within the 
dialogue’s dramatic subtext exhibited by its interlocutors.   
The following section will canvas Plato’s position on friendship qua Socrates in 
the Lysis by exploring the dialogue’s underlying dramatic subtext and, from that subtext, 
attempting to extrapolate meaning (latent and manifest conclusions or details) that may 
                                                 
2
 Aristide Tessitore, “Plato’s Lysis: An Introduction to Philosophic Friendship,” pp. 127-28. According to 
Tessitore, there are three conjectures one can draw from the Lysis. First, the activity of seeking 
understanding facilitates friendship. Second, through philosophical friendship, the dialogue attempts to 
define its first principle. Third, even though Socrates does not possess divine wisdom, he knows how to 
demonstrate the activity of friendship through philosophical inquiry, i.e. he has some idea of what 
friendship is. While these inferences from the text provide valuable insight concerning what the dramatic 
subtext reveals, this section will show that these basic speculative summations do not capture the depth of 
meaning that the dramatic subtext contains. Therefore, the following section will use these conjectures as a 
base to delve further into the dialogue in an attempt to gain a better understanding of what Plato is trying 
to convey but this section’s conclusions will demonstrate that Tessitore’s conjectures barely scratched the 
surface.    
 7
enable us to form an understanding of what Plato may have actually believed about 
friendship. While scholars debate many facets of this dialogue such as its contribution to 
Plato’s project as a whole, for example, does the Lysis develop middle Platonic 
doctrines; this section will primarily focus on the following three issues.3 First, what is 
the significance of Plato’s aporia in the dialogue’s closing remarks; second, what do the 
dramatic subtext and closing paradox enable us to understand about friendship; and 
third, based upon what the dialogue states concerning friendship and what conducted 
scholarship has found regarding Plato’s ethics, what might Plato’s beliefs on friendship 
have been?  
2.1 Plato’s Paradox  
In the Lysis, “Plato’s paradox” is the culmination and subsequent disparity 
between the dialogue’s surface interpretation and the dramatic subtext extant among the 
dialogue’s participants. More specifically, it is the aporia Plato constructs in the 
dialogue’s closing remarks where, on one hand, the failure of the group to define 
friendship (or its first principle) is contrasted by the dramatic subtext, which suggests 
that friendship was present through the interactions of the dialogue’s interlocutors. 
Therefore, while the elenchus’ participants could not articulate the essence of friendship 
as a state, the dramatic subtext illustrates the activity of friendship through the 
characters’ interactions—through philosophical activity, or the pursuit of gaining 
wisdom or understanding. This pursuit will enable us through careful study to excavate 
                                                 
3
 W.K.C. Guthrie, A History of Greek Philosophy, vol. 4 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1975) 
143. See also A.E. Taylor, Plato: The Man and His Work (London: Methuen and Company Limited, 1926), 
64.  
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information, which will permit construction of a speculative understanding of Plato’s 
theory of friendship, which bears a similar resemblance to Aristotle’s. For example, 
while Aristotle’s three main types of friendship are character-based, utility-based, and 
pleasure-based; for Plato, true friendship will strive towards the attainment of higher 
goods, its neutral version will aspire towards self-sufficiency in basic goods, e.g. health, 
and its faux version will pursue erotic relations.   
2.2 The Problem of Interpretation 
The Socratic fallacy, according to Guthrie, states: “we cannot know anything 
about x unless we know what x is in the sense of being able to define it.”4 Consequently, 
the following issue emerges: ‘If Socrates does not know what ‘friendship’ is, then how 
can he imply that Lysis, Menexenus, and he appear to others as friends?’ There are two 
considerations, which enable one to understand this paradox. First, one must consider the 
role of Plato’s theory of recollection in the dialogue’s construction. Second, by 
analyzing Socrates’ final remarks, one can fashion a point from which one can attempt to 
fathom the underlying elements directing the dialogue, for example, the nature of 
Socrates’ relationship to the boys.   
2.2.1 The Question of Plato’s Influence 
 As Bolotin interprets, the Greek word ‘lysis’ means ‘releasing’, i.e. “a releasing 
from chains.”5 Since the dialogue’s central character is named Lysis, and since the 
dialogue’s title shares that character’s name, one can assume that the dialogue involves 
                                                 
4
 W.K.C. Guthrie, A History of Greek Philosophy, vol. 4, p. 242 
5
 David Bolotin, Plato’s Dialogue on Friendship (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1979) 67. In Greek, 
‘λύσ’ (luo) means “loose” and can be conjugated into ‘λύσις’ (lysis), which means “to analyze”, “to untie”, 
and “to release”.  
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some form of change. Moreover, because the dialogue concerns an investigation into 
friendship, and more specifically, illustrates the nature of philosophical friendship, one 
can assume the change described concerns knowledge, for instance, Lysis’ transition 
from a shy youth who finds contentment watching others play to one who rebels against 
authority exemplifies this idea.6 Additionally, it evidences Socrates’ supposed 
“corruption of youth,” which actually embodies youth’s acquisition of wisdom.7   
Socrates’ role as facilitator of knowledge, or wisdom, is further shown through 
his symbolic association with Hermes who is the god of recollection. Just as Hermes 
provides good advice to guide wayfarers, Socrates germinates wisdom in the minds of 
others, thus enabling them to grow as rational human beings in life’s journey. Hence, 
instead of viewing the Lysis as a rhetorical catastrophe, or as a less successful precursor 
to Plato’s more prominent works on love, i.e. the Phaedrus and the Symposium, one 
should focus on the Lysis as a kernel, from which Plato’s social philosophy, in particular 
interpersonal relationships, grows. Thus, I shall explain how even though exploring 
metaphysical and epistemological issues, which would arguably be, more indicative of 
Plato, and likewise, how even though Socrates’ primary concern was debatably ethics 
(then despite the Lysis being an early dialogue, which, as many maintain, defends 
Socrates’ positions), there is evidence, which supports a more significant Platonic 
influence than many have previously interpreted.8 Though, as I.M. Crombie explains, 
                                                 
6
 Plato, Lysis, Plato: Complete Works, trans. Stanley Lombardo, ed. John M. Cooper (Indianapolis: 
Hackett Publishing Company, 1997)  207a-c; 223a 
7
 Plato, Apology, Plato: Complete Works, trans. G.M.A. Grube, ed. John M. Cooper (Indianapolis: Hackett 
Publishing Company, 1997)  23d 
8
 I.M. Crombie, Examinations of Plato’s Doctrines, vol. 1 (New York: The Humanities Press, 1963) 27-30 
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knowing exactly what knowledge Socrates may possess and what doctrines Plato wishes 
to convey through Socrates is a Herculean task.  
2.2.2 Plato or Socrates?  
If for the moment we assume that Plato’s Seventh Letter is authentic, thus setting 
aside the current controversy, then one can assume that Plato possessed a disdain for 
written philosophy because he felt true understanding could not be conveyed through 
words. According to the Seventh Letter, Plato explains how words are slippery—
ambiguous; not only do their meanings evolve through time and fail to grasp the entirety 
of the thought being expressed, but any constructed verbal statement contains holes that 
can be exposed. For example, philos possesses an ambiguous nature, meaning ‘friend’ as 
a noun and ‘liked’, ‘loved’, or ‘dear’ as an adjective.9 Therefore, hypothetically 
speaking, one could assert that Plato would never write a systematic treatise containing 
anything about which he ascribed importance because of the shortcomings of language, 
which he perceived.10  
Furthermore, if we continue to assume the Seventh Letter’s authenticity, then one 
could claim that, for Plato, “[moral knowledge] can only come about in a man who has 
both mental ability and also an affinity to the subject.”11 As such, the progression of 
understanding the universe, as a whole, would be a “long” and “laborious” process 
where “words, definitions and empirical observations” would be discoursed through a 
                                                 
9
 W.K.C. Guthrie, A History of Greek Philosophy, vol. 4, pp. 136-37; See also David B. Robinson, 
“Plato’s Lysis: The Structural Problem,” Illinois Classical Studies, 11 (1986): 63-83. In fact, one could 
even argue that Plato purposely exploits the ambiguity of philia and philos as a way of showing 
language’s inability to capture the essence of ideas.  
10
 I.M. Crombie, Examinations of Plato’s Doctrines, vol. 1, p. 18 
11
 I.M. Crombie, Examinations of Plato’s Doctrines, vol. 2, p. 122 
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“cooperative refutation,” involving questions being asked and answered.12 Hence, if the 
fallibility of language concerned Plato this much, then one could claim there is a strong 
possibility that he used the Lysis for educational purposes, e.g. classroom discussions.13  
 If Plato used the Lysis for educational purposes, then there are many potential 
implications, which require attention. For instance, the enigmatic nature of the Lysis may 
arise from Plato’s desire for the reader to discover her own truths. Ergo, Plato may have 
intentionally flawed Socrates’ arguments, forcing the reader to resolve, or at the very 
least grapple, with key issues concerning the dialogue’s topic, e.g. ‘If the good are self-
sufficient, can they be friends’.14 In fact, Plato may not hold any of the Lysis’ insinuated 
or espoused positions. It might be the case that he established flawed arguments to 
inspire certain thoughts, which are like, similar, or contradictory to those that Socrates et 
al. may express.15 In this regard, “Perhaps it was his regular practice to set down what 
seemed to him to be possible lines of argument, whether or not he was in agreement with 
them.”16 Nevertheless, this poses a problem if one desires to ascertain doctrines through 
textual analysis.  
There are three options at this point. First, one can confirm one’s theories 
regarding Plato’s doctrines through Aristotle’s texts. However, since those depictions are 
                                                 
12
 Ibid. 
13
 I.M. Crombie, Examinations of Plato’s Doctrines, vol. 1, p. 20 
14
 Plato, Lysis, 214b – 215c 
15
 I.M. Crombie, Examinations of Plato’s Doctrines, vol. 1, p. 18. Contrarily, one could argue, as Crombie 
shows pp. 27-30, that Plato’s primitive understanding of argumentation may have led to the Lysis’ logical 
flaws. However, while the charge that Plato was not superhuman and may have committed some of the 
fallacies may be applicable to other dialogues, based upon the role his elenchus containing the poor 
argumentation possesses, this view is doubtful here. His lack of understanding with respect to 
argumentation, though, may have exaggerated the poor quality of his arguments in the text, the faults 
manifest in the Lysis were most certainly intentional.     
16
 Ibid., p. 18 
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both unflattering and may pertain to real-life Plato and not the comments associated with 
any particular dialogue, this could be problematic. Second, one can place the Lysis 
within the greater schema of Plato’s project, i.e. how it relates to the Phaedrus or the 
Symposium; however, even if patterns of thought emerge, those observations would be 
subject to previous criticisms, for example, Plato may hold different perspectives than 
those expounded upon or alluded to in the dialogue, which would defeat the purpose of 
this investigation.  
 On the other hand, the third option would be, for the sake of argument, to analyze 
the Lysis on its own irrespective of its role within the schema of Plato’s other dialogues. 
Through this separation one could ascribe the dialogue’s doctrines to Socrates, 
especially since the Lysis is classified as an early dialogue. If one attributed the Lysis’ 
doctrines to Socrates, then Plato would not be identified as their beholder. This option, 
however, is problematic as well, for if, in his standard elenchus Socrates reacts to what is 
being said by one of its participants, then his thoughts are not necessarily being 
represented, for instance, in the Lysis, Socrates does not share Lysis’ and Menexenus’ 
bewilderment towards friendship as evidenced by the dialogue’s closing remarks.17 In 
other words, Socrates appears to have a solution to the paradox (which suggests that 
even though friendship’s first principle cannot be defined, it can be observed through 
philosophical activity). Though, because Socrates is only a character in the dialogue, one 
can only assume from a character’s perspective what that solution could be, which in this 
case, would be first person observational knowledge based upon dramatic activity 
                                                 
17
 Gregory Vlastos, “The Socratic Elenchus,” The Journal of Philosophy, 79 (1982): 711-14  
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among the dialogue’s interlocutors. Unfortunately, without the dialogue’s symbolism, 
for example, Socrates’ connection to Hermes, it is difficult to progress past a cursory 
understanding of the manifested doctrines.18 Thus, since our understanding of the 
dialogue’s doctrines goes beyond an observation that friendship is achieved through 
philosophical activity, then it would be reasonable to assume that the information 
presented through the dialogue’s subtext, particularly represents neither the real life 
Socrates’, nor the literary version.   
In actuality, if the Lysis is a learning tool, for instance, for group discussion, then 
the opinions expressed could be anyone’s. Nevertheless, despite this apparent 
shortcoming two things are certain. First, even if one is unsure of whom to ascribe 
certain beliefs within the text, this uncertainty does not entail that those beliefs do not 
exist. Second, Plato’s intentions during the dialogue’s construction will be guided by a 
philosophical agenda and whether or not his views are openly expressed, the dialogue, 
itself, should possess their unconscious manifestation. For example, even if Plato did not 
intend to link Hermes and Socrates as this section will show, there is an important 
connection.  
2.2.3 Socrates’ Final Remarks  
  In 223b, Socrates says, “Now we’ve done it, Lysis and Menexenus – made fools 
of ourselves, I, an old man, and you as well. These people here will go away saying that 
we are friends of one another—for I count myself in with you—but what a friend is we 
                                                 
1818
 In fact, this could be Tessitore’s problem. Because he omits Socrates’ relationship to Hermes, he 
cannot draw the inference that Socrates can help the boys on their journey. This omission denies him the 
opportunity to draw from the dialogue the relationship dynamics necessary to fully explore Plato’s theory.   
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have not yet been able to find out.” This is one of the only concrete bits of information 
provided in the dialogue. Since this information is provided as the dialogue’s final 
comments and since it contradicts the elenchus’ outcome, its anomalous appearance is 
critical to our inquiry, i.e. what in the dialogue prompted Socrates to assert this and how 
does this passage enable one to understand the dialogue?  
Since Socrates’ final comments are in response to the elenchus’ conclusion and 
that conclusion is verbally ascertained using Socrates’ interlocution with Lysis and 
Menexenus, then 223b most likely references what that conclusion does not incorporate, 
which is the dialogue’s dramatic subtext. Thus, the last part of the above excerpt: “but 
what a friend is we have not yet been able to find out” most likely refers to the group’s 
inability to formally define friendship. The first part, which states: “These people here 
will go away saying that we are friends of one another” represents others’ construal of 
the group’s friendly appearance. Lastly, when Socrates states “for I count myself in with 
you,” he overtly claims to be part of the group, i.e. he acknowledges his friendship to 
Lysis and Menexenus. Thus, when he says, “These people here [e.g. Hippothales] will 
go away saying that we are friends of one another,”19 he states modicum understanding 
of how people become friends, i.e. he can recognize it. As Tessitore states, this implies 
“human wisdom” on Socrates’ part; though, this information is only available in the 
dialogue’s nuances, for instance, when Socrates lectures Hippothales on his ridiculous 
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Hippothales how to befriend someone, more specifically, Lysis.  
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approach to pursuing Lysis and when he later banters with Menexenus on Lysis’ and his 
“perfect friendship.20  
2.3 The Dramatic Subtext  
 If one recalls, Plato titled the dialogue after Lysis who is the dialogue’s central 
character, and which, properly conjugated, is also the word for “releasing” in Greek. The 
word lysis, however, can also mean “solution”. Ergo, since the dialogue ends with an 
aporia—an intellectual conundrum with no foreseeable solution—then, perhaps, one can 
understand Lysis’ role within the dialogue as a key to that solution.  According to 
Guthrie, “Socrates chose this insanely different topic to engage the boys to use their 
minds.”21 Thus, the solution to the problem could come through the boys’ mental 
transformation in the dialogue, i.e. their release from bondage. In this sense, one could 
argue that since Socrates engaged the boys philosophically and since the activity of 
philosophy is what engendered their progression towards attaining wisdom, then one 
could maintain that the solution to the aporia is that friendship exists. It exists as an 
activity. Hence, even though one cannot deduce its first principle, one can learn to 
recognize it and engage in behaviors conducive to it without that knowledge. 
Consequently, this section will focus on the following relational dynamics.   
 First, the connection, and subsequent importance, between Socrates and Hermes 
will require more explanation than what this paper, thus far, has provided. Second, while 
this discussion will gloss over Hippothales’ relationship to Ctessipus, it must address in 
depth the relationship between Lysis and Menexenus, for their relationship is while 
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 W.K.C. Guthrie, A History of Greek Philosophy, vol. 4, p. 144 
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receiving un peu de mockery as the “perfect friendship” by Socrates, a relationship 
between two noble souls. Lastly, this section will need to discuss Socrates’ friendship to 
Hippothales and how through that friendship, Socrates demonstrates for him how to 
charm Lysis, for this relationship provides Socrates basic friendship model.     
2.3.1 Socrates and Hermes 
 Hermes etymologically means “he of the stone-heap,” “heap of stones, and 
stones by the wayside.”22 According to superstitions, when the gods acquitted Hermes of 
killing Argos, during the trial each cast their vote by throwing a “voting-pebble” at his 
feet, thus causing a pile to arise around him.23 In ancient Greece roadsides were lined 
with piles, or cairns, of stones. On these stone-heaps, wayfarers would toss pebbles to 
bring their journey good luck. Hence, because Hermes brought good fortune to travelers 
and wayfarers, he became their patron deity, for he became known as “the guide and 
giver of good.”24 In fact, they believed “it [was] his part to appear suddenly beside the 
traveler and help guide him with good advice.”25 If one recalls from mythology, Hermes 
assisted Perseus in slaying the Gorgon Medusa by guiding him to resources, e.g. the 
nymphs, the witches, and Athene, which would enable him to succeed in his quest.26  
Similarly, because grave markers, which were also sometimes made of stone, 
lined Ancient Greek roadsides along with the stone-heaps, Hermes became known as the 
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 W.K.C. Guthrie, The Greeks and their Gods (London: Methuen & CO LTD, 1962) 88; aka Mercury in 
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 17
god who guided the souls of the dead to Hades.27 Further, because of Hermes’ capacity 
for winged flight, he became a messenger from the gods and, sometimes, their errand 
boy. Hence, if one synthesizes these identities, and moreover, incorporates Hermes’ 
identity as a provider of good advice, then one can interpret Hermes as being the god of 
recollection. Since Socrates maintains that to know something is to recollect it, and since 
he is the catalyst for the boys’ newfound awareness, then one can argue Socrates is the 
patron to the ignorant in a similar vein to Hermes. Thus, the correlation between the god 
Hermes and Socrates is logical. In this way, Hermes becomes the ideal god for this 
dialogue, and Socrates becomes an ideal physical representation.  
Hermes was not only known for the speed by which he travelled but he was also 
known for his quick wits, which he used, for example, to slay Argus—the one-hundred 
eyed monster who guarded Io—by disguising himself as a common man and lulling him  
to sleep with soporific music and stories.28 According to W.K.C. Guthrie, Hermes was 
considered the cleverest of the gods.29 This association complements Socrates, for as 
Delphi prophesized, no one was wiser than Socrates.30 As Socrates was cunning in his 
approach to rhetoric, Hermes was known as a rascal among the gods who, within five 
minutes of being born, stole Apollo’s herd of cattle. This reputation caused thieves to 
consider him their patron, and unfortunately for Socrates, his rabble-rouser reputation 
earned him the dubious distinction of being known as youth’s corruptor.31      
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  Furthermore, Hermes was the god of fertility, the deity of the marketplace and 
traders, and the patron of the common man. He stood as a symbolic stone-heap in front 
of homes to protect their inhabitants just as he warded wild beasts away from wayfarers, 
shepherds, and flocks. Also as mentioned above, Hermes was the god of gymnastic 
sports, e.g. wrestling; therefore, the wrestling school and the Hermes festival taking 
place at the wrestling school, as mentioned above, possess an obvious connection.32 
Finally, Hermes invented the lyre and the shepherd pipe. The latter he melodiously 
played, and the former he gave Apollo as an amends for his post-natal chicanery.  
Ultimately, the connection between Socrates and Hermes invokes an interesting 
idea of friendship that overlaps with textual analysis. When Hermes helps others, e.g. 
wayfarers, travelers, Odysseus, and so on, he offers good advice; he guides them towards 
their goal whatever that may be. Friendship, it appears, for Socrates can be analogously 
construed. If one looks at the dialogue’s dramatic subtext, one will find that Socrates is a 
friend to wisdom like a doctor is a friend to health. In this respect, Socrates guides Lysis, 
Hippothales, and Menexenus towards wisdom while needing, desiring, or requiring little 
or nothing in return. In this respect, both Socrates and Hermes would be a guide; they 
would help others aspire towards some particular end. Whether that end is beheading a 
Gorgon or developing wisdom in others, they both help someone achieve a good. For 
Socrates, this good will be something that person lacks. Therefore, the good is beneficial 
for that person; it facilitates self-sufficiency.  
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 Pindar, The Extant Odes of Pindar, trans. Ernest Myers, 1904, The Project Gutenberg, ed. Ted Garvin, 
Jayam Subramanian, and PG Distributed Proofreaders, 14 Jan. 2004 
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2.3.2 Subtext Exploration  
Hippothales is in love with Lysis—an attractive boy of noble birth. According to 
Ctessipus, Hippothales’ attitude towards Lysis is ridiculous. Not only does he sing 
songs, which eulogize Lysis, his family, and his ancestors, but he talks about Lysis 
incessantly to others and even calls out Lysis’ name in his sleep. This behavior 
galvanizes Socrates to address Hippothales’ naivety, and consequently, invoke his 
awareness of it. First, while Hippothales may think his praises are for Lysis; in reality, 
they are for him. Second, his praises address Lysis’ superficial qualities and not his 
nobility; hence, even if he was fortunate to attract Lysis, irrational and transient passions 
constitute his love in lieu of reason’s culmination into wisdom.  
Socrates, therefore, warns Hippothales not to celebrate his victory before being 
victorious. If Hippothales praises Lysis, and resultantly, wins Lysis’ affection, then his 
conquest would be respected more by others. However, if Hippothales constantly lauds 
Lysis, then Lysis’ ego will grow, thus making it more difficult for Hippothales to attract 
him. In effect, if Lysis rejects Hippothales after his relentless pursuit, Hippothales will 
not appear favorable to others at all. Thus, Socrates decides to teach Hippothales the 
appropriate way to talk to one’s beloved. He advises Hippothales to control himself—
mollify his behavior. To do so, Socrates recommends humbling Lysis and decides to 
demonstrate this approach to Hippothales.  
In 206d, one becomes aware that the boys at the wrestling school are celebrating 
the festival of Hermes, and thus, are involved in rituals and sacrifices in honor of the 
god. In truth, this is the only section where anyone utters Hermes’ name in the entire 
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dialogue. Since the dialogue possesses strong allusions to Hermes, this event is 
significant. Based upon where Hermes’ name is mentioned in regards to where the 
dialogue is in its progression, one could say that this is where Plato links the symbolic 
elements of the dialogue involving Hermes to the dramatic subtext exemplifying that 
symbolism. Not only is this juncture one of the few places where something tangible can 
be garnered from the dialogue—Socrates’ advice to Hippothales, but Plato uses the 
following paragraphs (206e-210e) to establish the groundwork for the more contentious 
parts of his elenchus with Menexenus. Additionally, this particular section marks the 
germination of Hippothales’ journey where Socrates demonstrates the proper way to talk 
to one’s beloved. As such, two significant things occur here, which are fundamental to 
not only the elenchus, but to grasping Plato’s intentions on the whole.  
First, through a brief series of questions Socrates establishes the near identity of 
Lysis and Menexenus. Bolotin argues that Plato uses the parallels between Lysis and 
Menexenus to show that even close friendships, which appear perfect, possess flaws. He 
suggests that Plato shows this by exposing their rivalry through arguing over who is 
older.33 However, this interpretation misses the point of Plato’s inquiry if one analyzes 
this section with respect to the dialogue as a whole. If Plato’s intent is to show Lysis’ 
and Menexenus’ basic similarity, for instance, they are both good looking, from wealthy 
families, and of noble birth, and if he desires to establish their appearance as perfect 
friends, then it makes more sense to interpret this section as: ‘Lysis and Menexenus 
admit their disagreement over who is older, from a nobler family, and better looking 
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because it emphasizes their likeness concerning physical attributes, familial background, 
and socioeconomic status, i.e. if the difference were apparent, then they would not need 
to argue’. In fact, regarding these traits, Plato desires to show their near identity, i.e. 
Lysis’ and Menexenus’ disagreement alternatively intimates sameness.  
This view is corroborated by that passage’s final remarks where Socrates states: 
“And friends have everything in common, as the saying goes; so in this respect the two 
of you won’t differ…”34 This statement is ironic because he establishes that they argue 
over different characteristics as to who is better; though, in actuality, the converse is 
shown.35 Therefore, as the dialogue will show, their true difference is not in what they 
are or who they are, but in how they are, i.e. their personalities. This distinction is 
critical, for it illustrates what Socrates means when he asserts: “if you two are friends 
with each other, then in some way you naturally belong to each other.”36 Lysis, of 
course, is more docile, and Menexenus is more quarrelsome. In this way, they are 
naturally complementary.  
Second, since they are alike and not identical, and since they belong to each 
other, and resultantly appear to be perfect friends, it is important to note that neither is 
self-sufficient. If Socrates is the wisest man in Athens and still views himself as a lover 
of wisdom, then neither Lysis, nor Menexenus can be wiser than Socrates, i.e. both must 
be deficient concerning wisdom. If both are deficient concerning wisdom, then neither is 
self-sufficient. Hence, when Socrates establishes the nobility of both boys, this reference 
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implies that, at least, the boys desire to attain ‘the good’ and that even though they are 
not self-sufficiently good, they are definitely not bad. Therefore, if they are neither good, 
nor bad, then they must embrace the good on behalf of the bad—ignorance, i.e. they 
need an intermediary. Since Socrates can enable the boys to gain wisdom to shed their 
ignorance, then friendship exists between Socrates and the boys. In this regard, when 
Socrates exposes Lysis’ lack of knowledge, comparing him to a slave, it is moreso a 
statement with respect to his deficiency than stating his “wholly ignorance” as he did to 
Hippothales.37 In other words, he is awakening Lysis to the chains in which he resides, 
thus providing the necessary awareness for him to rebel against those oppressive 
authorities.38 By illuminating certain truths about Lysis’ life, Socrates benefits Lysis 
(and Menexenus for that matter) and thus befriends him. This gesture insinuates to 
Hippothales that philosophical inquiry fosters the development of friendship in the best 
possible way.   
According to Guthrie, Socrates equates ‘the good’ to what is always useful, or 
beneficial, and never harms. Therefore, something such as courage “leads to happiness 
when guided by wisdom,” i.e. “[it] cannot fail to be beneficial” if it is associated with 
reason. In extension, since what is useful with respect to ‘the good’ involves higher 
pleasure, then by seeking ‘the good,’ one receives a more profound pleasure than those 
activities associated with baser pleasures such as drinking, eating, and eroticism.39 
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Hence, if a philosopher is a friend of wisdom, and wisdom is critical to pursuing ‘the 
good’,  then the philosopher, who enables one to become wise, functions as an 
intermediary between the “wholly wise (the gods)” and the “wholly ignorant.”40 While 
neither Lysis nor Menexenus are “wholly ignorant,” for if they were ignorant, then they 
could not possess goodness, or aspire to do so, for ignorance, by definition, infers 
unawareness, Hippothales is. Hippothales’ ineptitude while not qualifying him as being a 
bad person, does mark his ignorance. Thus, while Lysis, Menexenus, and Hippothales 
are all neither good, nor bad, there is a definite distinction between the levels of 
ignorance between Hippothales as opposed to Lysis and Menexenus. Though, these 
levels do not hinder the application of the model of friendship manifest in the text.    
In 211a, Menexenus returns, thus shifting the focus back to both Menexenus and 
Lysis (the close friends) instead of upon Lysis alone (the moderately good but deficient 
individual). Moreover, in this section one becomes aware of the effectiveness of 
Socrates’ interaction with Lysis, for in this same paragraph, Lysis asks Socrates to “tell 
Menexenus what [he’s] been saying to [him].” Socrates, however, does not acquiesce 
Lysis’ request. Instead, in the spirit of Hermes, he tells Lysis to apply what he has 
learned and if he needs help would gladly assist him.  
2.3.3 Occurrences of Friendship    
Already the dialogue has established that Lysis and Menexenus desire ‘the good’. 
Moreover, the dialogue has shown that they are both not identical and that they are not 
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self-sufficient. However, in 211e, Socrates admits his admiration of Lysis’ and 
Menexenus’ friendship. Friendship is something about which he is “absolutely 
passionate.” To Socrates, it is the greatest external good—far more desirable than any 
animal and both Darius and his gold. He praises that they have achieved what he has 
sought his whole life so quickly and easily during their youth. Even though his praise 
has a playful connotation, there is truth behind his banter.  
Socrates’ elenchus, while broaching many pertinent topics, is a disaster, for it 
fails in its goal of formally defining friendship. In fact, its participants end the discussion 
in the same place they began both frustrated and seeming to have brought no iota of 
cogency to fruition. Nevertheless, despite this apparent surface failure, the activity itself 
underlying the elenchus was a success for many reasons. First, the activity of 
philosophy, or pursuing wisdom, has generated friendship among three seemingly good 
people, which according to the elenchus was not possible. After all, if one is self-
sufficient, then one does not need friends.41  
Plato, though, rebukes this idea through the interactions of his characters. If only 
the gods are absolutely wise, then any mortal is going to be deficient in this 
characteristic. Thus, every mortal will need to philosophize to pursue the good life. 
However, if no mortal can become wholly godlike, then she will never fully be able to 
achieve perfect friendship.42 As such, people who desire to be “good” will always 
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require others to become self-sufficient. In effect, each good person functions as a philo-
sopher—an intermediary—to the others to attain wisdom. For Socrates, this appears to 
be the highest exhibition of friendship.  
Second, it appears that Socrates posits two ways in which the idea of friendship 
manifests: the friendship of usefulness (the higher kind, which enables the development 
of wisdom, and basic type, which facilitates fundamental goods such as one’s health), 
and one way in which it can be deceiving: the erotic association. Demonstrating these 
distinctions seems to be why Socrates requires Hippothales. Hippothales is erotically 
attracted to Lysis, however, Socrates shows him that this attraction, as mentioned above, 
is base in two ways. Initially, he shows that his passion for Lysis is irrational. He shows 
this by addressing Hippothales’ ignorance to his own self-interest, and how his complete 
lack of wisdom hinders his approach. Thus, Socrates attempts to invoke wisdom in this 
wholly ignorant boy. Once Socrates has demonstrated the appropriate way to talk to 
one’s beloved, he shows how friendship exists among noble people through his 
elenchus. Unfortunately, Hippothales misconstrued Socrates’ demonstration. Thus, 
understanding is not why Hippothales “beamed with every color of the rainbow.”43 
Instead, he thought that Lysis now loved him. This misconception, of course, intimates 
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that Hippothales may not have changed too much throughout the course of the dialogue. 
In fact, he still could be interpreted as bad.   
2.3.4 Two Senses of Useful  
According to Annas, “Friendship is construed as desire to possess or acquire 
some good quality which the agent lacks, where this lack is a bad thing. This is 
illustrated over a wide range—the body, for example, which is neutral, feels philia for 
medicine, which is a good, because of the presence of disease, which is bad.”44 As stated 
above, ignorance is antithetical to wisdom, the former being good, and the latter being 
bad. However, the object of love in friendship does not necessarily need to involve 
immediate gains in wisdom. As the dialogue shows and Annas articulates, ‘the good’ can 
pertain to a range of objects. Socrates, however, focuses on a fundamental difference.  
On the one hand, there is a sense of good, in which one can become self-
sufficient. One can categorize this sense of ‘the good’ as a basic sense. There are three 
places that insinuate what this understanding of friendship is. First, in 211e Socrates 
states that while some people may value fame, money, or animals, he is absolutely 
passionate about friendship. This distinction creates two levels of useful objects: basic 
and higher. Socrates insinuates the significance of the latter in 207b where he reveals 
Lysis’ and Menexenus’ near identity with respect to external goods in their lives. 
However, although both have been fortunate in their lives concerning external goods, 
they lack what noble birth, wealth, and so on cannot obtain—wisdom. Therefore, 
because neither Lysis, nor Menexenus possess godlike wisdom, they are deficient. In this 
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regard, while both boys represent what a common conception of “perfect friendship” is, 
as Socrates intimates, because their friendship lacks philosophical activity, it is not ideal. 
For example, one can be healthy, yet still locked in chains.  
Lastly, in 218e Socrates discusses how a person who is ill overcomes that bad 
thing by befriending a doctor who will facilitate ‘the good’, which is health (and also a 
friend). While this relationship uses the model manifest in the dramatic subtext, it 
exhibits how we help one another attain basic goods and not virtue of character. As 
Aristotle states, “Socrates the senior thought that the End is to get to know virtue, and he 
pursued an inquiry into the nature of justice and courage and each of the divisions of 
virtue.”45 This observation strengthens the claim that Socrates distinguishes between 
higher and basic benefit; and furthermore, suggests that while the basic sense pertains to 
health, fame, money, etc, this relationship is neutral for three reasons. Firstly, it cannot 
be bad because bad people cannot form successful relationships with others. Secondly, it 
is most likely not virtuous because virtue is something towards which one always 
aspires. Thirdly, one can be famous, wealthy, healthy, etc. but not be truly happy. 
However, if one is wise, this does not appear to be the case. Thus, it appears that this 
relationship is neutral, and since it is neutral, it will always be subordinate to the 
philosophical type.  
Moreover, one can be self-sufficient with respect to basic goods, for if one is 
healthy, famous, wealthy, etc., then one will no longer require them. If one no longer 
requires basic goods, for example, if one goes to the doctor and regains her health, then 
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she is no longer deficient in that capacity; then that person will no longer need others, for 
instance, a doctor, to provide them. In this sense, one would no longer need to remain 
part of a community. However, since one can never fully be virtuous, i.e. since one 
cannot achieve godlike wisdom, and since wisdom enables the development of virtues, 
one will never be self-sufficient, and hence, will always require the assistance of friends.  
Thus far, this section has suggested that there is a hierarchy of relationships 
within the Lysis. There is the bad, which is the erotic relationship; there is the neutral, 
which is the relationship based upon the attainment of basic benefits; and there is the 
good, which is the relationship based upon philosophical activity (this last relationship is 
the higher, more enlightened, representation of usefulness). As Guthrie stated, ‘the good’ 
is always useful, or beneficial, and thus, never harms. While the basic sense of benefit is 
capable of harm, for instance, the pursuit of wealth can lead to poverty, the higher sense 
is not capable of harm in any way, for even if one does not perform well in philosophical 
activity, that person still benefits because that person’s degree of wisdom increases. 
Therefore, even if “friends” are not absolutely good or wise, they can still facilitate 
others’ aspirations towards those goals. This is what Socrates, Lysis, and Menexenus 
evidenced through the elenchus, and this is what resolves Plato’s Paradox, for true 
friendship only exists through activity. It cannot be defined. This distinction will divide 
Aristotle and Plato qua Socrates, for in Aristotle’s ethical theory, friendship exists as 
both an activity in which one participates as well as an articulated state. 
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2.4 The Aristotelian Turn 
 Despite the presence of ascertainable information, many questions remain based 
upon our need to speculate—to interpret—the cryptic information manifest in the Lysis. 
Thus, while one could infer that elements of friendship, e.g. good will, generate 
friendship based upon questionable textual evidence, there is little proof to substantiate 
this claim. This is where Aristotle flourished. Questions Plato left unresolved such as: 
‘What are the origins of friendship, i.e. what are the things that engender it?’; ‘Can 
friendship exist among strangers?’; and, ‘What is the nature of a parent and child’s 
relationship?’, invoke strong reactions in Aristotle, which he fully develops in the 
Nicomachean Ethics, Eudemian Ethics, and Politics. 
 As the next section will discuss, Aristotle espouses a polymorphic conception of 
friendship, which centers on how one befriends oneself, i.e. the good form of self-love. 
In this regard, Aristotle makes evident his belief that genuine friendship is other-
regarding. This is not as obvious in Plato’s treatment where it appears the opposite 
would most likely be true. However, one must ask oneself: ‘Why is Socrates friends with 
Lysis and Menexenus?’; ‘How does he benefit by trying to help Hippothales?’ The short 
answer to this question is that like Aristotle, Plato possesses a conception of civic 
friendship. Hence, by helping the boys become more virtuous Socrates enhances the 
political community. Though, contrary to Aristotle, Plato’s theory of friendship is not 
going to have as significant a normative force, and while friendship still possesses 
cohesive properties concerning the community, people are not going to be as socially 
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enmeshed. This characteristic will replicate itself in Kant’s theory of friendship in 
Section 4. For now, however, our attention will turn to Aristotle. 
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3. ARISTOTLE’S POLYMORPHIC REDEFINITION OF FRIENDSHIP BASED  
 
UPON PLATO’S LYSIS 
 
 
 
While the importance of Plato’s Lysis is debatable among scholars with respect 
to his project as a whole, there is no question regarding the profound effect this work had 
on Aristotle’s ethical theory. The dramatic subtext, the baffling antinomies, and the 
closing aporia inspired the way in which Aristotle formulated many of his integral ideas 
concerning his theory of friendship. The following section will investigate the ways in 
which the Lysis influenced Aristotle’s conception of friendship and the importance of 
that influence on his ethical theory as a whole.  
First, this section will explore Aristotle’s definition of friendship. This 
exploration will segue into an explication of how friendship affects the political 
community and its constituent parts. Next, based upon this foundation, this section will 
discuss Socrates’ and Lysis’ conversation about his relationship to his parents in relation 
to how Aristotle understands friendship as manifest in the household. This discussion in 
conjunction with our exploration of the political community will provide the necessary 
background to discuss how the Lysis’ dramatic subtext and how Socrates’ elenchus 
influenced Aristotle’s comparatively dynamic conception of friendship, for example, 
Aristotle’s reconstruction of self-love. By the section’s close, our discussion will have 
developed the necessary background to dissect Kant’s theory of friendship in Section 4 
and discuss both Plato’s and Aristotle’s respective influence upon him.    
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3.1 What is Friendship?  
 Aristotle, as mentioned above, proffered a comprehensive theory on friendship, 
which included many other social relationships other than what ‘the good’ exhibited. As 
Ross states, “[friendship for Aristotle] can stand for any mutual attraction between two 
human beings.”46 While this definition intimates the general idea, according to Cooper, 
who later rebukes Ross, this idea is too broad, for “People can be ‘mutually attracted’ to 
one another without in any way developing active ties—without doing anything 
together, or for one another—and such mere attraction would not be counted as φιλία.”47 
For example, Aristotle remarks: “Those who welcome each other but do not live 
together would seem to have good will rather than friendship.”48 By definition, good will 
expresses genuine regard for others. However, if two virtuous people display good will 
towards one another, even though good will originates character-based friendships, good 
will only becomes friendship through reciprocation over time.49 If the people are 
strangers and never see each other again, then despite their reciprocated amiability, their 
exchange will not have developed into any form of friendship. In response to Ross’s 
oversight, Cooper cites On Rhetoric as the appropriate starting point to understand and 
define what Aristotle’s conception of friendship is.  
 Aristotle, in On Rhetoric, defines a “friendly feeling” as wishing another well for 
her sake and doing what is necessary to facilitate that well-being. As mentioned, those 
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who reciprocate these feelings over time are what Aristotle regards as one’s friends.50 In 
this vein, friends treat us well; they share our pleasure and pain; and, they share in what 
we like or dislike and sympathize with whom or what we consider good and evil. 
Additionally, as Aristotle notes in the Nicomachean Ethics, those sympathies include 
concordance concerning our choices as well as enjoyable activities in which we can 
share.51 Fittingly, “in loving [one’s] friend [one] loves what is good for [oneself, i.e. 
friends share common desires]; for when a good person becomes a friend he becomes a 
good for his friend,” exchanging with equality what that friend has received and 
enhancing that person’s life.52  
 Furthermore, friendship involves love. It pertains to how one loves, or befriends 
oneself, and how one loves, or befriends, others. As Aristotle notes, “loving is the virtue 
[and activity] of friends” and must correspond to a friend’s worth.53 Hence, through a 
sense of proportional equality friends exchange goods, i.e. the object of love qua friend, 
which one is pursuing. This exchange can manifest three ways: through pleasure, 
through advantage, or through virtue.54 For example, two friends may find fishing 
relaxing, discover a professional bond, which enables both friends to earn more money; 
or, enjoy the other’s company through philosophizing together. However, problems arise 
when each friend pursues the friendship for different reasons. For instance, if one 
befriends another for pleasurable reasons, e.g. as a fishing companion, and the other 
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befriends that person for another reason, e.g. professional advancement, then because 
each friend enters the friendship pursuing a different object of love in the other, the 
friendship most likely will wane and consequently dissolve once one no longer perceives 
the presence of that good through the other. Case in point, when the lover stops feeling 
his love returned or the professional no longer requires the other for advancement. Here, 
the exchanged goods no longer equalize, thus causing one of the friends to become 
deficient in the friendship.55 
 As alluded, good will is love’s manifestation in one’s regard towards another. In 
other words, it is friendship’s catalyst among good people just as erotic passion and 
advantage cause the other, incomplete forms to arise. While Plato, in the Lysis, suggests 
good will as essential to friendship when he states in 219a that nothing is a friend of the 
lover unless it loves him in return, one cannot sustain this assertion as Platonic doctrine. 
Aristotle, on the other hand, elaborates on this claim by stipulating good will’s 
importance to the perseverance of friendship. Without the existence of prolonged 
reciprocation of good will, one’s friendship will disintegrate. Thus, evidencing good will 
is essential, and consequently, is the reason why two strangers exchanging its 
benevolence briefly will not be friends. As Aristotle maintains, those strangers only 
possess the potential to be friends, i.e. their friendship is inactive. In this sense, good will 
does not suffice for friendship even though it is requisite for it.56      
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3.2 The Whole and Its Parts 
 In the Lysis, Socrates argues that one befriends the neutral for the sake of the 
good and on account of the bad. In other words, friendship is the activity that enables 
those involved to strive for ‘the good’. This is why Lysis and Menexenus becomes 
Socrates’ friend and this is why Socrates befriends the boys. If one recalls from the 
closing remarks of the last section, Socrates exhibits civic friendship through his 
interactions with Lysis, Menexenus, and Hippothales. By enabling Lysis and Menexenus 
to develop wisdom, Socrates sets the boys on a path towards ‘the good life’. This 
gesture, in turn, facilitates the growth of a virtuous political community. However, for 
Plato, friendship does not possess the same importance as it does for Aristotle. While the 
activity of friendship may develop a virtuous community through various interactions, 
for Aristotle, “friendship is community.”57  
 In order to be virtuous and attain eudaimonia, one must engage others, for it is 
only through the joint participation in activities where one actualizes and maintains the 
realization of one’s capacities, i.e. the co-existence of good people enables the 
appropriate cultivation of virtue.58 Thus, since reason is our ultimate capacity and the 
activity of philosophy allows reason to fully enable one to realize herself as a human 
being, and thus, live a virtuous existence, our participation in that activity and our 
aspiration towards wisdom will enable the development of eudaimonia. Conversely one 
can conclude that the avoidance of philosophical endeavor will thwart one’s journey 
towards that ultimate goal. Hence, in response to Socrates and Plato, Aristotle states: “in 
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awarding the happy person all the goods it would seem absurd not to give him friends; 
for having friends seems to be the greatest external good.”59 This claim inverts Plato’s 
and Socrate’s belief, which alluded that friends were the greatest external good in aiding 
one towards the good life and not existing as a part of the good life itself.60 
3.2.1 Sources of Normativity 
People, for Aristotle, are rational, political animals. We are social beings who 
can use reason to fathom needs and desires, and possess speech—communicative 
abilities, which enables us to convey those needs and desires and express what is painful 
or pleasurable, what is harmful or advantageous, and what is just or unjust. In effect, our 
awareness of needs and desires combined with our capacity for speech, naturally draw us 
together for generation, for example, man and woman, and for preservation, for instance, 
ruler and ruled.61 And, while various communities originate to stay alive, their ultimate 
purpose, however, is to help its members live well; it is to create an environment that 
endeavors to assist its citizens’ pursuit of eudaimonia.62 In this sense, friendship is the 
cohesion for all communities whether that community is one’s household or political, i.e. 
without the existence of friendship, which enables those citizens to meet their needs both 
daily and long-term, society would not exist.        
Eudaimonia, of course, is our ultimate good; it is the ultimate end at which all of 
our actions are directly or indirectly aimed. It is completeness, happiness, flourishing, 
and self-sufficiency all incorporated into a single achievement—the good life. Since the 
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function of cities is to facilitate this pursuit, then the virtuous city will enable its citizens 
the opportunity to become eudaimôn. In this regard, the city and its citizens strive 
towards the same end, and thus, are reliant upon one another to attain that end. This 
interdependency creates a cyclical effect within cities where a just city produces just 
citizens who, in turn, become just rulers, thus creating just laws, which further 
perpetuate the justice, prudence, and virtue manifest within both the city and its 
denizens. This is why the study of political science, what Aristotle considers the end of 
all sciences, is paramount to a virtuous society. It is the science that underlies the 
formation of laws that enable the society to which they are applied to either flourish or 
decline.63 For Aristotle, as stated, friendship is integral to that pursuit.  
Metaphorically speaking, the political community is the whole—the body, and 
the lower communities which form it are its parts. In effect, the political community 
controls the lower communities, which controls the individuals within those 
communities. The individuals in the lower communities, or the households, form 
villages to meet their daily needs just as the villages coalesce into a city to gain self-
sufficiency. Therefore, the virtuous household manager will instill virtues within the 
household members. The households, as well as its members, will influence, through 
their various friendships, other households in the village. And, the villages will influence 
the political community through their concord concerning issues. Analogously, the 
legislators will construct laws that govern the people. If those laws are just, then the 
various communities will be just and develop just members, and consequently, those just 
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members will rule their households with the same degree of justice as the political 
community in which they live. Thus, the political community is only as just as its 
members, and the level of justice will influence which style of friendship is most 
prevalent. Furthermore, since the community members determine the nature of the 
political community and vice versa, according to Aristotle, society has a cyclical nature. 
This nature causes three sources of normativity to develop: virtue-based, civic-based, 
and ruler-based; and, these forms of normativity are governed through the various 
friendships extant within the community.  
The virtue manifest in the lower communities is contingent upon the justness of 
the higher. Ultimately, the justness of the political community will determine the 
justness of its individual citizens. The most just polity is a kingship where the ruler rules 
for the sake of the ruled and not for himself. In this particular polity, the king’s 
relationship to his subjects is homologous to that of a father’s relationship to his son. 
Aristotle describes this relationship as paternal; hence, the form of friendship is a 
“paternal friendship.”64  
The king, like the father, is responsible for nurturing and educating his subjects 
as the father does for his children. Therefore, since the king is just, and consequently, 
rules for the sake of his subjects, his subjects will possess similar dispositions and 
character-based friendships will be common among them. In political communities such 
as this, because the king has instilled virtue through various laws and education into his 
subjects, his subjects are virtuous. Hence, since the king and his subjects are both 
                                                 
64
 Ibid., 1161a10-15 
 39
virtuous, they have a lot in common such as desires. Thus, since the king and his 
subjects share desires, the king’s decisions will coincide with the will of his subjects. In 
this regard, the relationship between the king and his subjects is a character-based 
friendship where the king is superior to his subjects.65    
Political friendship, or civic friendship, is based on “advantage and with what 
affects life [as a whole].”66 The legislator’s job is to nurture civic friendship among the 
political community’s citizens. This is the friendship, as alluded earlier, that is 
“cohesive,” i.e. it holds cities together. Therefore, if legislators do their job well by 
focusing on the development of virtue in their constituents, then not only will friendship 
exist among the citizens over whom they legislate, but since they have fostered virtuous 
friendships, the highest form of justice will prevail. Furthermore, if the highest form of 
justice prevails, then those within the various communities will have the same stable 
wishes and desires, i.e. the same mind. This homogeny, consequently, will enable the 
existence of concord, and not discord, among citizens concerning decisions and 
resolutions made, for they will all agree upon what is advantageous. This agreement will 
enable communities to become a normative force among citizens.  
 According to Aristotle, “each [friend] moulds the other in what they approve of, 
so that ‘[one learns] what is noble from noble people’.”67 As suggested, if the regime is 
egregious, then people will mold each other into iniquitous human beings by reinforcing 
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those behaviors in others; however, if the regime is virtuous, for example, a kingship, 
then when the citizens educate one another on the good life, they will teach each other 
appropriate behavior. Therefore, in the best regimes those who excel are extolled by 
others while those who misbehave are punished.68 For instance, the youth and the base 
are ruled by passions—the irrational part of the soul. Hence, both groups of people 
require corrective treatment to modify their behavior and instill as well as reinforce a 
sense of temperance.69 In this respect, Aristotle applies a primitive behaviorism where 
honor and love are used as an incentive to render aversive behavior extinct. On the one 
hand, decent people desire confirmation from others concerning their actions. If decent 
people approve of their actions, then they know their actions have merit. However, since 
people see that those lauded have an excess of character, and consequently, receive their 
encomiums because of that character, people desire to become noble for nobility’s sake 
and not for some ulterior reason such as fame or wealth. In other words, character and 
not material gains are their ultimate motivation, for while an excess of money or fame 
can bring comfort, only virtue can invoke eudaimonia. Virtue, in this sense, is another 
source of normativity, for it prevents one from developing a vicious disposition by 
supplying loose laws for appropriate action.   
Virtue, for Aristotle, “(a) is a state that decides, (b) [consisting] in a mean, (c) the 
mean relative to us, (d) which is defined by reference to reason, (e) i.e., to the reason by 
reference to which the intelligent person would define it. It is a mean between two vices, 
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one of excess and one of deficiency.”70 In other words, virtue is “the state that makes a 
human being good and makes him perform his function well. Since our function is to 
reason well, then virtue assists our ability to problem-solve, or make decisions.71 If one 
lives in a just community, then one will receive knowledge concerning the various 
virtues through moral education. Then, when one applies what one learns, one will 
harmonize what one learns with how one acts. This process will habituate virtue and 
facilitate correct reasoning. Correct reasoning will enable us to strive with intelligence 
towards the mean between the aforementioned vices, or extremes, for once one has 
intelligence, then one has all the virtues. For example, if one desires to be witty and one 
has the tendency for being boorish, then one needs to aim their actions more towards 
buffoonery so that that person can achieve the mean. As such, virtues normatively guide 
our behavior as a splint corrects a bone fractured in all directions. Eventually though, 
those who aspire to be noble hope that those splinters will become one euphoric 
unification of the soul.  
If one compares this account of normativity to the account represented in Plato’s 
Lysis, there is one striking difference between the two theorists. While Plato’s theory 
proffers the pursuit of wisdom, and subsequently, virtue as the desire to become useful 
to others, Aristotle contradicts this account by arguing that a virtuous person self-
cultivates virtue for the sake of itself. Further, if that person habituates any social norms, 
then that person will do so because she desires eudaimonia and not the goods others 
provide her, for she knows if she behaves well, then she will naturally procure those 
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goods, for example, since virtuous people have common desires, they are naturally 
drawn together unlike the egregious whose disparity distances themselves from one 
another.   
Accordingly, the Platonic moral hero will shape herself based upon social norms 
into what the community views as virtuous. If one does not develop, for instance, 
wisdom then one will not become useful to others, and consequently, will not have any 
friends, which means that that person will not become self-sufficient. Hence, through 
self-invention one aspires to be useful, or beneficial. By becoming beneficial, that person 
will nurture companionship and perhaps friendships in many ways, e.g. erotic relations.  
This line of reasoning is problematic for Plato, for if what is always beneficial 
and never harms is good, and one aspires to be beneficial, then, according to this 
account, one never really develops a true sense of self. Instead, one exists as a 
culmination of myriad social constructs, which one perceives as advantageous. 
Therefore, while both Plato’s and Aristotle’s conceptions of normativity stem from 
community engagement, it is how one engages that community that separates them. This 
idea will become more evident when I discuss Aristotle’s conception of self-love.  
3.3 The Household  
  In the Lysis, Socrates demonstrated to Hippothales how to talk to one’s beloved 
by humbling Lysis through philosophical inquiry, thus exposing Lysis’ general lack of 
wisdom. First, Socrates discusses Lysis’ relationship to his father and suggests that 
Lysis’ father must not view him in high regard since he not only allows slaves to do 
things that he forbids Lysis to do, e.g. drive mules, but he assigns guardians to escort 
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Lysis to school and employs schoolteachers to train him. Second, Socrates discusses 
Lysis’ relationship to his mother. She, like his father, only permits him to participate in 
activities of which he has knowledge, e.g. letter writing and lyre playing. Lysis’ 
neighbors, likewise, restrict what he can and cannot do based upon his lack of 
knowledge, e.g. rule Athens. As a result, since Lysis does not understand things, no one 
has any use for him, and because nobody has any use for him, no one will desire to 
befriend him. Consequently, no one will love him, including his parents. However, if he 
were to gain wisdom, as Socrates argues, the opposite would occur. In the Politics, 
Aristotle discusses the topics in this argument and combines them into a cogent 
framework.   
First off, since Aristotle’s ethical theory dictates that people are enmeshed in 
communities, we must isolate the relationships in this argument to grasp Aristotle’s 
departure from Socrates. Hence, there exists the relationship of father and son, mother 
and son, father and mother, neighbor and neighbor, father and slave, son and slave, son 
and neighbor, and son and miscellaneous authority figure, e.g. schoolteacher. Secondly, 
since these relationships necessarily (with the exclusion of neighbor and neighbor) 
possess lopsided power dynamics, for instance, the father rules the son, exploration of 
normative influences will be essential. Lastly, since Socrates’ argument pertains to what 
Aristotle considers the household, and since the household is the political community on 
the smaller scale, household management concerning these relationships as well as their 
correlation to the political community will be warranted as well.  
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3.3.1 Household Management  
 While those who rule the political community use political science to enhance 
the wellbeing of its citizens, household managers develop acumen in household science 
to procure daily household necessities for its members.72 Subsequently, household 
managers require property, or a “multitude of tools,” to obtain them. For example, 
households need non-living tools such as plows, and living tools, such as oxen. They 
need tools for “making” such as beds and clothes, which serve a specific purpose as well 
as tools designed for “doing” such as slaves, which function as assistants implementing 
into practice other tools, for example, a weaver who controls a shuttle, or a look-out man 
who stands atop a tower.73 Therefore, through gaining adroitness in their household 
affairs, or business, household managers ensure those within their household that the 
limits of what is needed to attain wellbeing and facilitate the good life are met.74 In this 
regard, the household manager, or father, rules his house like a king over his subjects; 
however, this relationship requires qualification.  
To Aristotle, barbarian men and women lacked the capacity to rule. Because of 
this deficiency, they existed in a culture of slavery where women and slaves were 
considered the same. The Greeks, therefore, because the barbarians were unable to rule 
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themselves, were morally justified to enslave them. This example illustrates Aristotle’s 
belief that some people are born slaves while others are born free. Those who are born 
slaves are not human beings; they are tools with souls.75 As such, masters, or household 
managers in our case, and slaves have nothing in common. Their relationship is 
characterized by tyranny; though, according to Aristotle, since the master-slave 
relationship is analogous to body and soul, it benefits neither the slave, nor the master if 
they cannot coexist, for if the master rules the slave poorly, then neither will be able to 
fulfill their household role. In this regard, both master and slave gain if they can attain a 
mutual friendship, which allows both to fulfill their purpose well.  
Referring back to Socrates’ earlier argument, Socrates equated Lysis’ position in 
life, at least with respect to freedom, as being beneath a slave. Further, he concluded at 
the argument’s end that since Lysis lacked wisdom, and therefore usefulness, nobody 
would love him, including his parents. While Socrates’ remarks were not meant to be 
taken as Socratic doctrine, there is textual evidence that he may have believed something 
similar.  
Socrates, in 217c, creates an analogy using hair color based on a conundrum 
concerning ‘the bad’: ‘In 214d, Socrates argued that since the bad are out of kilter—
unstable, and thus, different from one another, they cannot be friends, nor can they 
befriend anyone. Contrarily, since the good have characters, which are both stable and 
similar, it is possible for those who are good to genuinely befriend others who are good. 
However, in 217c Socrates states if one befriends one who is neither good, nor bad, and 
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consequently loves ‘the good’ on account of the bad, then is the person really bad or 
only its appearance? If the person is truly bad, then it is impossible for that person to 
love the good, for the bad and good are disparate.’ Socrates surmises that one is not bad 
yet if one is in the presence of the bad. In other words, one must become bad by 
renouncing the good on account of the bad. Alternatively, one must embrace it to 
become good, i.e. one must grow into it just as one’s hair becomes grey in old age. 
Lysis is like a lowly slave because of his lack of wisdom. While Lysis is not a 
bad person who is ignorant in itself, he is neither good, nor bad in the presence of 
ignorance. As a result, Socrates instructs Lysis that he should seek wisdom on account of 
that ignorance so that he can become useful. If he develops usefulness, then everyone 
will want to be his friend. They will belong to him, and as a result, he will become free. 
Conversely, if he remains ignorant, then not even his parents will love him. He will not 
belong to anyone like a friend belongs to another with complementary characteristics. 
He will be useless, which would be slightly lower than the useful slave who can function 
in at least one beneficial capacity.   
Nevertheless, because Lysis is not naturally bad and is still incomplete, Socrates’ 
conclusion, then, that Lysis’ parents do not love him is exaggerated. Their love for Lysis 
is not the same as their love towards others, for this is not the nature of their relationship 
to him. As Aristotle suggests, the father rules over a child like a king over his subject 
and the mother rules over her child like an aristocrat over hers.76 Therefore, there is both 
an intrinsic superiority and advantage within the relationship between parent and child. 
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Further, since the parents rule over the child, this relationship implies growth, 
maturation, development. Hence, normativity also is a key facet of the relationship, for 
the parents are a necessary source of moral standards, or values, for the child. Both 
Aristotle and Socrates concur in this conclusion. However, while Aristotle considers this 
relationship friendship, Socrates, and subsequently, Plato do not.  
While friendship for Plato (and Socrates) stems from a sense of usefulness, true 
friendship develops through the pursuit of wisdom. This characteristic, as Socrates 
holds, is not present in the relationship between Lysis and his parents. If that were the 
case, then Socrates would not have been able to surmise that Lysis’ parents do not love 
him and thus show Lysis’ lack of wisdom. As both Plato and Aristotle make evident, the 
parent-child relationship is that of superiority. The aim of that relationship is for the 
parents to ensure that the child is fed, educated, and so on by guiding the child’s process 
of maturation. Therefore, because of the “oppressive” nature of this relationship, true 
friendship is not manifest within it for both Plato and Aristotle.   
3.4 Self-love   
 From the political community our discussion has progressed to the individual 
where how one befriends oneself will determine how that person relates to others. For 
example, if one desires nothing but advantage, e.g. their ultimate aim is wealth, then that 
will be the basis of her interactions with others. The same can be said for those who base 
their friendships on pleasure and those who center their relationships with others on 
developing character. As stated previously, Plato only considered those who connected 
through philosophy as friends and based that ideal on a self-regarding form of self-love, 
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i.e. one befriended others for her own sake. For Plato, the ultimate goal of friendship was 
to gain one’s own self-sufficiency—freedom. Hence, philosophy was a person’s means 
towards that goal and one engaged others with that intention in mind. Alternatively, 
Aristotle’s ultimate end is eudaimonia, which is by definition self-regarding as well. 
However, Aristotle ameliorates Plato by openly infusing an altruistic element into his 
conception of self-love.77 Thus, as this section will demonstrate, the person who guides 
her life by virtue will perform actions, which are consciously other-regarding and as a 
result have a mindful understanding of what is best for not only her but in the various 
communities of which she is a member.78   
3.4.1 Self-love’s Two Sides  
In the Nicomachean Ethics, self-love translates as philautos, which means “a 
friend to oneself.” Knowing the Greek root of the word is critical to grasping the 
function of this concept within Aristotle’s ethical theory. Aristotle posits two forms of 
self-love; however, he connects what represents each form to the type of friendship the 
person expressing each form represents, for example, the good form correlates to 
character-based friendships and the bad form to pleasure-based and utility-based. Ergo, 
the virtuous person will demonstrate the good form and the vicious will evidence the 
bad. In this sense, reason guides the person who exhibits the good form of self-love just 
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as feelings guide the person who embodies the bad. Since reason guides the good form 
and since the good form involves well-being’s cultivation, then because virtuous people 
naturally use their reason to cultivate their well being as well as the well-being of others, 
those who display the good form of self-love are virtuous.79  
Contrarily, feelings guide the bad form of self-love. Through their reliance on 
feelings those who display this form are self-regarding and not concerned about the well-
being of others. They are vicious, incontinent people seeking pleasure and shunning life. 
They make poor decisions and are full of regret. But most importantly, they are not 
friends to themselves; they are unlovable people who destroy themselves instead of 
cultivating their well-being. Therefore, they are incapable of caring for the well-being of 
others because they are unable to correctly nurture their own.80 These are the people who 
pursue pleasure and advantage in life and form relationships based upon those 
foundations. 
3.4.2 The Second Self  
Since self-love concerns how one befriends oneself, i.e. it’s a manifestation of 
friendship, its development is integral, for this is how true friends originate. For 
Aristotle, true friends are a second self; they are an extension of who we are.81 Since true 
friends only exist among the virtuous and since the virtuous are similar and desire 
similar things, e.g. reason-based activities such as philosophical inquiry, then cultivating 
the friend’s well-being is like cultivating one’s own. Moreover, because the virtuous 
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person loves herself, and because the friend is a second self, the virtuous person will 
love and treat her friend as she would herself. In this sense, the virtuous person acts for 
her friend because the friend is essentially the same person. And, since the virtuous 
person and her friend are essentially the same person, they will have an analogous 
conception of not only what eudaimonia is, but what the best means of attaining it are. 
Thus, even though every action a true friend performs towards her friend aims at her 
eudaimonia, since the true friend is like a second self, that action aims at the true 
friend’s eudaimonia as well and is, consequently, other-regarding. 
Furthermore, Aristotle asserts that virtuous people perform actions that benefit 
the community’s common good. 82 Since virtuous people compete for what is finest, 
those who are virtuous strain to perform the finest actions. Moreover, since “the good 
person must be a self-lover….he will both help himself and benefit others by doing fine 
actions,” even if those actions lead to costly sacrifices such as the sacrifice of one’s 
wealth, one’s honor, or one’s life.83 Because of this willingness to engage in virtuous 
activities, “each person individually will receive the greatest of goods.”84 For example, 
on a basketball court, there are five positions filled by five players: two guards, two 
forwards, and one center. Each person has a different function on the team, for instance, 
the guard passes the ball and shoots long-range shots and the center rebounds the ball 
and scores from close-range. In short, if the players on the team fulfill their functions 
and realize their capacities, the team is better as a whole. If the players on the team learn 
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how to use the skills they developed together, then the team will become even better. 
Consequently, it will win more games, and the players will receive greater honor from 
those wins. On the other hand, if the players on the team do not develop their skills and 
they do not play well together, then the team will most likely lose no matter how talented 
its players are compared to the other team. The following two examples show this idea. 
 If a team’s guard aspires to be excellent, then—based on the above description—
she will have to develop her long-range shooting and passing abilities. While one of the 
skills (long-range shooting) attains greater honor through point scoring, the other 
(passing) is paramount to a team’s overall success, for if a guard cannot pass, and 
therefore distribute, the ball well to her teammates, then the team will not be able to 
score as many points, and consequently, not win as many games. Therefore, if the guard 
increased her ability to shoot and did not practice passing, while she may become the 
league’s top point scorer, the team may not have a winning record. As such, the player’s 
demonstration of bad self-love hinders the prosperity of the team. This is further 
exhibited in the second example.  
There are ten seconds left in the NBA finals. The Boston Celtics are losing by 
one point to the San Antonio Spurs. Ray Allen (Boston’s All Star guard) steals the ball 
from a San Antonio player and begins dribbling the ball down the court towards the 
Spurs’ basket. Allen notices, while dribbling down court, that Tony Parker (San 
Antonio’s guard) is going to intercept him on his way to the basket, forcing a mid range 
jump shot, which while being a relatively easy shot for Allen, would not be for certain. 
Allen, however, has another option. In his peripheral vision, he sees Kevin Garnett 
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(Boston’s Hall of Fame center) approaching the basket as well; he is open for an easy 
layup or dunk.  
Rather than risking the game by missing the shot, since Allen is a virtuous 
player, he realizes the best option would be to pass the ball to Kevin Garnett. Even 
though he sacrifices the individual glory of winning the championship game, he realizes 
that winning the game is more important even for his own self-interest, for then his team 
would be champions, which is the highest honor a team can receive. Thus, in this case if 
Allen’s teammates are virtuous, i.e. they feel that the team comes first and personal glory 
second, then his pursuit of eudaimonia both aligns with and benefits their pursuit. 
However, if Allen exhibited the bad form of self-love and had taken the shot so that he 
could procure more endorsements, then Allen’s goal would not align with what is best 
for the team or for himself as an individual. Furthermore, if his teammates felt the same 
and acted only for themselves, thus not acting for what is best for the team, but for their 
varying goals, e.g. endorsement money, fame, and personal statistics, the demonstrated 
selfishness would most likely cause unfavorable results. 
This example not only shows the nature of self-love but illustrates the way in 
which virtues normatively guide a person in how one befriends oneself, for if one desires 
eudaimonia, then one must strive towards being virtuous, for when one is virtuous, 
others benefit. More specifically, the community benefits as a whole. Though, if a 
person acts on behalf of her own interests, then the community is not necessarily 
benefited. This self-regarding attitude engenders tyranny because the aims of the just 
community and the virtuous person align.  
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This idea differs from Plato whose conception of friendship in the Lysis focuses 
more on individual aims. However, even though Plato’s theory is not overtly other-
regarding to the same extent as Aristotle, his representation of friendship does show how 
the pursuit of virtue indirectly benefits others. If one participates in philosophical inquiry 
to become wiser even if that person does not participate in the activity with the intention 
of benefiting the other, as previously stated, his pursuit of wisdom will still benefit those 
with whom he participates in the activity. Hence, one could argue that Plato’s theory 
possesses an unintended altruism, i.e. altruism would be an unintended consequence of 
one’s action. This summation, however, does not account for Socrates’ genuine regard 
for the boys in the dialogue. If one recalls in the Lysis, Socrates does truly desire to help 
the boys. In this sense, helping those boys is his aim the activity. Therefore, it would 
seem for both Plato and Aristotle that the virtuous citizen enables virtuous communities 
to not only exist, but to exist in harmony.  
3.5 Types of Friendship  
 In the last section, we explored the Lysis’ dramatic subtext and discovered 
allusions to various relationships, which many would construe as being friendships, for 
example, the erotic relationship, parent-child relationship, basic good, civic, etc. While 
Socrates chased the idea of friendship’s illusion, thus discounting those relationships as 
being friendships, Aristotle’s polymorphic approach, as we have discussed, incorporated 
them and used their dynamics to construct an intricate social framework where 
friendships enabled cohesion on many levels. Like Plato’s dramatic subtext, Aristotle 
proffers one true form of friendship and then offers two incomplete. While Aristotle and 
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Plato’s conception of pleasure-based relationships are analogous, Aristotle and Plato 
differ in their understanding of the utility-based. And, while their position on true 
friendship has many parallels, Plato restricts our understanding of it to the recognition of 
and participation in the activity while Aristotle articulates the state.   
3.5.1 Pleasure-based Friendships  
Aristotle argues that pleasure-based friendships are guided by feelings based on 
what appears to be pleasant at the time. These pleasures are not long-lasting, though, but 
do provide immediate fulfillment for the individual’s whims. Thus, because of the 
transient nature of these pleasures, the friendship is incomplete. People who participate 
in these friendships desire what is nearby and because they desire the immediate, the 
friendship is not meant to be long-lasting. It will only last as long as the encounter 
remains pleasurable or their desires are met. When the participants no longer desire what 
pleasures the other person offers, the friendship will dissolve. Aristotle cites the itinerant 
qualities of youth, especially concerning erotic love. This provides a prime circumstance 
where this friendship can be applied, for when one partner loses her sexual appeal, 
pleasure is no longer acquired from the other party and since pleasure is no longer 
gained, the friendship ceases to exist in the same capacity if at all.  Therefore, the love in 
this friendship is the love of the incidental pleasure-providing features of the other, 
which facilitates pleasure in those pursuing the relationship.85 In this respect, Aristotle’s 
pleasure-based friendship mirrors the irrational lust of Hippothales where Hippothales 
praised Lysis’ external qualities without recognizing who Lysis really was.  
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3.5.2 Utility-based Friendships 
 The utility-based friendship originates in the usefulness of others. Hence, those 
friendships that provide and are based on advantage compose this classification of 
friendship. In this friendship, the participants demand some benefit—some sort of useful 
good. This friendship can form based upon a variety of pursuits. For example, two co-
workers may help each other advance, or two people may support one another as each 
respectively tries to re-establish a functional existence.  
If one recalls from the Lysis and the last section, Plato also recognized the allure 
of different ends to achieve the same goal. Socrates preferred friendship to other external 
goods such as fame, wealth, and animals and Plato alluded to a difference between basic 
goods such as health and higher goods like courage. However, since the bad can neither 
befriend the good, nor each other, Plato construes this relationship as enabling good, for 
example, this relationship can assist one in becoming healthy. Furthermore, if one 
further recalls, one can become sufficient concerning the procurement of basic needs. 
Though, since this relationship does not directly permit the cultivation of virtue, then it 
is not friendship. 
However, when one no longer enables the other to procure the goods or when 
those goods are no longer required, the friendship dissolves unless it morphs into another 
type, e.g. pleasure.86 Oftentimes this scenario will occur when inequality emerges 
because one friend exceeds what the other is capable of providing, for instance, one 
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friend is promoted at work to a high-paying position, or conversely, one friend loses her 
job and can no longer reciprocate workplace advantage. As such, like the pleasure-based 
friendship, this relationship is incomplete. Alternatively, Aristotle posits a third type of 
friendship—the character-based—which not only incorporates facets of both the utility-
based and pleasure-based friendships, but is essential and not incidental.  
3.5.3 Character-based Friendships 
Only the virtuous are capable of attaining this form of friendship, for the virtuous 
are capable of recognizing a person’s good character and are capable of forming a 
friendship for its own sake based upon that character. Further, since eudaimonia is 
sought by the virtuous, their actions aim at that end. As such, while their friendships will 
contain advantage and pleasure, those are not the objects of their affection. Instead, they 
pursue the good life, which means that character is the object they pursue.  
Unlike Plato, the character-based friendship is not just something towards which 
one aspires. Instead, it is something attainable. Although as Aristotle notes, this type of 
friendship is not common. It is the first friendship; the primary form, which is self-
sufficient and complete. These attributes, of course, as well are not achievable according 
to the Lysis. Nevertheless both Plato (through Socrates) and Aristotle hold that 
philosophical activity incites its development. Though, as Plato will dissent, the 
philosophical activity involved is self-motivated and self-regarding. This belief, of 
course, differs from Aristotle who introduces a primitive form of altruism in his 
conception of an other-regarding self-love.   
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3.6 Kant’s Aristotelian Framework  
  In the Metaphysics of Morals, Kant voices his famous words concerning 
friendship: “Aristotle says: My dear friends, there is no such thing as a friend!”87 With 
analogous authority, in Lectures on Ethics, Kant resounds: “Socrates remarks, ‘My dear 
friends, there are no friends’, he implies thereby there is no friendship which fully 
conforms to the Idea of friendship.”88 While this assertion may seem natural concerning 
Plato who scholars have argued does not believe true friendship exists based upon the 
elenchus’ conclusion in the Lysis, this belief appears a bit peculiar when ascribed to 
Aristotle, especially if one were to claim, for example like Marcucci, that Kant corrects 
himself in the Metaphysics of Morals when he refers to Aristotle.89 
In the Metaphysics of Morals, Kant follows his assertion concerning Aristotle’s 
position on friendship with: “The following remarks may draw attention to the 
difficulties in perfect friendship.”90 According to Marcucci, Kant was referring to the 
perfect equality between friends, which must occur if a perfect friendship is to develop. 
As Kant claims just prior, perfect equality between friends is something to which one 
can only aspire, for the tension between one’s desire to fully self-disclose oneself and the 
fear of not being respected once one does so prevents true friendship from materializing. 
While Marcucci makes an astute observation concerning Aristotle’s concept of equality 
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and how Kant might use that to interpret Aristotle’s position on true friendship, there are 
three considerations Marcucci does not address. First, in the Nicomachean Ethics 
Aristotle explicitly states that while perfect friendship is rare it does exist. Second, Plato 
can be speculated as being more explicit concerning his disbelief in true friendship than 
what one may openly interpret in Aristotle.91 Third, Aristotle is referring to shared 
activities and quality of character and not the dynamic relationship between respect and 
self-disclosure. While the conclusion to Socrates’ elenchus on a surface level can 
suggest that there are no friends, for Aristotle this conclusion is not clear, and thus, 
requires some attention.  
In the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle states: “[character-based friendships] are 
likely to be rare since such people are few.”92 This assertion should settle this dispute; 
Kant is wrong. Though, to make this conclusion at this time would be a disservice to 
Kant. After all, Kant is one of the most important philosophers in history, and there are 
different ways to read Aristotle. Hence, I would like to briefly explore this topic before 
proceeding into the next section because Aristotle’s framework regarding friendship is of 
paramount importance to Kant’s. Thus, it would be beneficial to deduce a better 
understanding of their relationship.   
First off, Kant states in his Lectures on Ethics: “[Friendship of disposition and 
fellowship] can exist only between two or three friends.”93 This line concurs with the 
above excerpt from Aristotle. Hence, it certainly is possible that Kant does realize that 
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Aristotle makes this claim. Therefore, the question arises: ‘How does Kant read Aristotle 
so that this parallel would exist?’ Furthermore, can Aristotle be interpreted to think that 
the idea of friendship is true but its absolute realization impossible? While this section 
has discussed Aristotle’s theory of friendship and explicated what Aristotle means by 
true friendship, it has failed to acknowledge ‘primary friendship’—a key element of 
Aristotle’s theory in the Eudemian Ethics, which, it appears, influenced Kant on a 
fundamental level.  
While Aristotle deduces the types of friendship from ‘first friendship’—the 
primary form—in the Eudemian Ethics, he spends little time on this concept in his later 
work. The reason for this may be that Aristotle included the concept of primary 
friendship into his understanding of character-based friendship. In other words, if a 
person is one of the few who participates in a character-based friendship, then that 
person participates in a perfect, self-sufficient, complete, true friendship. However, if 
one focuses upon Aristotle’s deduction of friendship in Eudemian Ethics, then one might 
be able to infer a slight difference between the two concepts. This observation would be 
useful for two people: first, the person who considers the Eudemian Ethics as Aristotle’s 
more mature work; and second, the person who wants to interpret Aristotle as one who 
denies various concepts in their perfection, for example, friendship. 
In regards to the first group of people, Kenny notes that relative consensus 
regarding the chronological order of these books (the Eudemian Ethics precedes the 
Nicomachean Ethics) was a more recent phenomenon. In fact, one could still interpret 
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the Eudemian Ethics as being the more mature of the two treatises.94 Just because, as 
Kenny argues, the Eudemian Ethics resembles Plato’s dialogues more regarding the 
terminology used, does not necessitate distance from the dialogues themselves. While 
one could classify Kant’s reading of Aristotle as such, this endeavor would be far too 
speculative for this particular project.95 Hence, while one could argue that because Kant 
favored a view which laid in between Aristotle and Plato, he preferred this particular 
treatise over the more mature version, this short thesis project is not sufficient for this 
issue. For the moment, there is a more viable solution to our problem if one focuses 
upon Aristotle’s description of primary friendship. 
According to Aristotle, the primary form of friendship is true friendship, or first 
friendship, i.e. it is the form of friendship towards which everyone aspires. In this sense, 
the primary friendship is similar to the character-based friendship he describes in both 
moral treatises. In fact, as he states in both moral treatises, the primary form of 
friendship is included in the character-based friendship, for where there is pleasure from 
goodness between two people who share in joint activities, the primary form of 
friendship is present.96 However, is the primary form of friendship identical to the 
character-based? In other words, do the primary form of friendship and the character-
based friendship share homologous qualities? 
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There is an important distinction at this point which must be made. In the 
Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle establishes identity in his discussion of perfect friendship 
between primary friendship and character-based friendship.97 However, one could read 
into the Eudemian Ethics the claim that this identity does not exist. Instead, the types of 
friendship are related to the universal as instrument relates to surgery in the term 
‘surgical instrument’. This reading of Aristotle would be analogous to Kant’s position on 
friendship, which states that there are three ideals of friendship, which are patterned after 
the Idea.    
According to Aristotle, the primary form of friendship is the universal. It is 
absolutely good and absolutely desirable. Ergo, it is perfect. However, while the primary 
form of friendship is universal among the different types of friendship: pleasure-based 
friendship, utility-based friendship, and character-based friendship, i.e. “The primary is 
that of which the definition is implicit in the definition of all,” the same is not true for 
character, utility, and pleasure, i.e. the definition of pleasure is not implicit within the 
definition of friendship.98 In this sense, while character-based friendships can exhibit the 
qualities identically if they were to manifest in their purest form, since humans cannot 
achieve that level of friendship, and with that, those qualities, their friendships will 
always be deficient with respect to the primary form. This idea is analogous to Kant’s 
conception of true friendship as something unachievable because the necessary equality 
between self-disclosure and respect will not permit its culmination.  
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Moreover, in the Nichomachean Ethics, if one achieves a character-based 
friendship, then one has achieved the primary form of friendship for character-based 
friendships are identical. However, in the Eudemian Ethics, since character-based 
friendships are related to the primary form and since character-based friendships most 
embody the primary form, one could hold that only the highest manifestation of 
friendship is identical and not just related to it. In other words, both character-based 
friendships and primary friendships in their absolutely perfect state possess the same 
qualities. Otherwise, the two friendships are only relational.  
Since human beings cannot attain absolute perfection, then the greatest degree of 
friendship two virtuous people could achieve would not contain all of the qualities of 
perfect friendship in how it exists in the primary form, i.e. it would be deficient in some 
capacity. Even if that deficiency is minute, it still obstructs one’s aspirations of 
perfection. Kant posits the same relationship between his friendship of disposition or 
sentiment and true friendship where the relationship between respect and self-disclosure 
prevents the culmination of equality. In a similar vein, one could construct an argument 
addressing the qualitative differences of various properties with respect to certain 
friendship arrangements, i.e. the qualitative difference of pleasure in the pleasure-based 
friendship and the character-based friendship. 
In the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle claims that the utility-based friendship and 
the pleasure-based friendship are incomplete versions of the character-based. For 
instance, while the pleasure-based friendship will possess pleasure, this pleasure will be 
inadequate compared to the pleasure one derives from, for example, philosophical 
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activity. In this regard, there is a qualitative difference concerning pleasure and how it 
manifests in different relationships. With respect to the primary form of friendship in the 
Eudemian Ethics, one could argue that since primary friendship is represented 
differently in each friendship (for primary friendship concerns how the types relate to the 
universal, or definition) and this qualitatively changes based upon the kind of friendship 
to which it pertains (for example, two pleasure-seekers will strive towards achieving that 
object of love in the friendship), then there is no identity between the primary form and 
the character-based because the primary form of friendship is equivocal, i.e. there is not 
one definition that fits all exactly.99 While this reading does not align with Kant’s theory 
of friendship, it is certainly plausible that he read Aristotle this way and re-structured the 
problems he foresaw in Aristotle based upon that reading.  
While these interpretations are speculative, it is critical to have some awareness 
of the possible relationship of Kant and Aristotle on this fundamental level because this 
relationship will constitute the bulk of the subject matter about which one can converse 
concerning the rest of his theory.   
3.7 Kant’s Copernican Revolution  
 As stated, Kant synthesizes Plato and Aristotle. While he keeps Plato’s model, he 
utilizes Aristotle’s framework. In other words, friendship for Kant is an idea towards 
which one aspires; it is a duty. According to Kant, friends help one another attain self-
sufficiency—autonomy—through the mutual pursuit of holiness. In this regard, Kant’s 
ethical theory, e.g. his conception of friendship, is teleological. Furthermore, like 
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Aristotle, Kant’s conception of friendship is polymorphic in nature, thus categorizing a 
variety of relationships as friendship. And, like both Plato and Aristotle Kant’s 
understanding of friendship gels the community. The following section will examine 
these differences and commonalities in an attempt to evaluate the effectiveness of Kant’s 
treatment of friendship. 
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4. FROM PHILIA TO FREUNDSCHAFT: AN EXPLORATION OF KANT’S 
COPERNICAN REVOLUTION 
 
Kant’s ‘Copernican Revolution’ facilitated the reconciliation of an irreparable 
rupture in the history of philosophy by fusing classical and Christian thought into a 
perspective framed by the boundaries of human reason both theoretical and practical. 
Through this reconciliation, Kant not only advanced metaphysics by shifting the 
foundation, thus modifying the paradigm from which systems formed, but also Kant 
proposed an ethical theory, which utilized a Greek sense of virtue while being guided by 
a priori moral laws excavated by reason and not provided through faith. With this 
contribution, Kant would progress the study of ethics, by creating a rational duty-based 
system and exploring neglected regions of ethical theory virtually untouched since 
Antiquity, e.g. friendship, which according to Wood, “One would have to go back as far 
as Aristotle to find a major philosopher for whom friendship is as important to ethics as 
it is for Kant.”100 For friendship is paramount to Kant’s anthropology, providing the 
micro details for Kant’s macro project—the ethical community.101 Hence, to truly fathom 
the aims of Kant’s moral philosophy, one should develop an understanding of Plato’s 
and Aristotle’s respective ethical theories.    
If one recalls from the last two sections, both Plato and Aristotle believed in the 
existence of true friendship. While for Aristotle true friendship was something attainable 
and its definition understandable, Plato espoused a view, which defended the activity of 
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friendship, e.g. people can demonstrate friendship towards one another, but could not 
define the concept. Through the contrast between Plato’s and Aristotle’s respective 
theories concerning philia, Kant proffered an understanding of Freundschaft 
(friendship), which synthesized the perceived strengths of both philosophers: Plato’s 
Theory of Ideas and Aristotle’s Categories. Through this amalgamation, Kant 
constructed a framework, which possessed familiar attributes, for example, analogues to 
Aristotle’s basic types of friendship; innovations such as the dynamics involved in 
respect and self-disclosure; and differences, for instance, Kant’s view that neither the 
activity of friendship, nor its perfection are realizable by humans. In this sense, Kant’s 
theory of friendship is an ideal case study to analyze Kant’s connection to the Greek 
virtue ethicists.  
Oftentimes, Kant’s critics overlook or downplay the strength of this connection, 
which is unfortunate since even the deontological, or duty-oriented, facets of Kant’s 
theory possess overtones of virtue ethics. Hence, this section will address the following 
issues. First, it will explicate Kant’s paradigmatic shift in a historical context. This 
exposition should provide the necessary background to appreciate Kant’s moral 
philosophy, which utilizes pure reason as its primary source of normativity. Afterwards, 
this section will discuss Kant’s relationship to the Greeks where through a comparative 
analysis will support the claim: ‘Kant’s ethical theory is a vein of virtue ethics’. This 
section will, further, address two common criticisms of Kant, which state: First, Kant’s 
ethical theory is “morally schizophrenic” and second that it is too stringent. With respect 
to the first critique, in one sense the attack is false, for example, the virtuous person in 
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Kant’s ethical theory, whose will mirrors the moral law, will perform the virtuous 
actions dictated by the moral law because she wants to. However, there is one sense in 
which genuineness is problematic. When one acts for the sake of duty, one does not 
necessarily act for the sake of the person. This issue will be demonstrated through the 
“Friendship Dilemma,” which will not only exploit a limitation in Kantian friendship, 
but will also raise the question as to whether Kant’s theory is other-regarding. Thus, 
through a comparative analysis between Kant’s theory of friendship and Plato’s and 
Aristotle’s respective theories, this section will show that unlike the Greeks whose 
ethical theories are other-regarding for the sake of the agent, i.e. the people involved and 
the circumstances matter, Kant’s ethical theory will focus on the action itself because 
one is bound by the moral law to perform that action (the empirical elements of the 
action are irrelevant). This distinction is a defining departure from the Greeks and can be 
argued to be “schizophrenic”.   
4.1 Reconciling the Irreconcilable   
The popularization of Christianity during the Roman Empire galvanized a 
paradigm shift that would henceforth redefine philosophical endeavors in Western 
Thought. Through this paradigmatic shift, the concept of duty became prevalent among 
ethicists. Resultantly, the infusion of duty would alter what constituted ‘the good life’ in 
the following epochs.   
While the Romans praised aspects of Greek culture, e.g. philosophy and art, they 
believed the grandeur of Rome, itself, derived from their faith in the gods. They were 
devout; they were patriotic. They believed that those who held political ideals, which 
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dissented from the conventional ones enforced by the Empire, were rabble rousers who 
could incite the unraveling of the pristine order which manifested itself in the splendor 
that Rome embodied.102 Thus, the adoption and resulting success of legalizing 
Christianity is no surprise given the nature of how it was implemented. By synthesizing 
Stoicism and Jewish Tradition, the Romans had established a means of controlling the 
population as well as a new vehicle that would function as a splint nurturing the proper 
growth of philosophy throughout the next millennia.103 This paradigm would be 
characterized by a reliance on faith and emphasis on duty. Thus, the Greek’s moral hero 
became tragic, falling from grace atop Mount Olympus to her knees where she was 
humbled before God as a casualty of social change.  
 Descartes would incite the next epochal shift, catalyzing the decline of religion-
guided philosophy by enthroning reason.104 This empowerment would demystify certain 
prior spiritual myths, by demanding that knowledge be accountable to “computation and 
utility.” Hence, what did not conform to these standards would be subpoenaed by reason 
to the courts of judgment where it would cast its verdict condemning those truths that 
betrayed the laws of the Enlightenment.105 Consequently, since religion began to use 
philosophy as a means of justification, decadence would follow leading to religion’s 
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inexorable destruction, for the nature of religion requires no such proof.106 Though, 
while this change meant detriment to religion in relation to philosophy, it incited a re-
evaluation of the Ancient Greeks, and this re-evaluation illuminated the path that would 
engender Kant’s ‘Copernican revolution’ and reconcile these two traditions.107 Thus, the 
following section will explain Kant’s relationship to both duty-based ethics as well as 
virtue ethics.  
4.2 Kantian Virtue 
  Is there a disharmony between reason and motivation within Kant’s ethical 
theory? While Michael Stocker does not address Kant directly the following passage 
represents how one might criticize him:  
 
 
 
…a morally good intention is an essential constituent of a morally good 
act. This seems correct enough. On that view, a morally good intention is 
an intention to do an act for the sake of its goodness or rightness. But 
now, suppose you are in a hospital, recovering from a long illness. You 
are very bored and restless and at loose ends when Smith comes in once 
again. You are now convinced more than ever that he is a fine fellow and 
a real friend—taking so much time to cheer you up, travelling all the way 
across town, and so on. You are so effusive with your praise and thanks 
that he protests that he always tries to do what he thinks is his duty, what 
he thinks the best. You at first think he is engaging in a polite form of 
self-deprecation, relieving the moral burden. But the more you two speak, 
the more clear it becomes that he was telling the literal truth: that it is not 
essentially because of you that he came to see you, not because you are 
friends, but because he thought it his duty.108 
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 In “Kant’s Virtue Ethics,” Louden responds to this style of objection against 
Kant’s ethics. According to Louden, Kant is typically the “whipping boy” for deontology 
by its various critics. However, those who primarily criticize Kant, for example, virtue 
ethicists such as Foote, Macintyre, and Williams, usually focus too much upon the 
deontological facets of Kant’s ethical theory. In other words, adversaries usually 
accentuate Kant’s position concerning discrete acts and downplay his regard for the 
agents themselves. According to Louden, “[Kant] sought to build an ethical theory which 
could assess both the life plans of moral agents and their discrete acts.” Hence, Kant’s 
ethics possessed elements of both deontology and virtue ethics. In fact, as Louden 
concludes Kant’s views on morality laid in between the two positions.109  
 Louden’s observation is critical to this section’s developing examination of the 
parallel between Kantian ethics and Greek moral philosophy, especially concerning his 
treatment of friendship. In effect, Kant’s ethics were teleological; they were aspirational; 
and the cultivation of virtues was a significant aspect of his theory. Hence, even though 
pure reason’s application of the categorical imperative enables one to fathom the 
synthetic a priori practical principles of the moral law, there is a process of becoming—a 
self-created rational end—towards which one strives and from which one can gain a level 
of fulfillment, which is superior to the empirical conception of happiness posited by 
Greeks such as Plato and Aristotle.  
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4.2.1 A Normative Re-adjustment  
 For both Aristotle and Plato, the community shaped us. While for Plato 
community influence occurred through a self-regarding desire for completeness, and its 
consequent freedom through one’s interactions with others; for Aristotle, citizens were 
enmeshed within social networks, which inculcated their members with favorable 
patterns of behavior oftentimes through education and a variety of friendship 
arrangements.110 For example, Aristotle emphasizes the need for a human being to 
receive an appropriate education so that that person can mature into a virtuous human 
being who demonstrates good will to those in the political community. Kant, however, 
differs from Aristotle concerning moral education, especially with respect to the 
community in which one is a part. In regards to the education of ethics, for instance, 
Wood notes in Kant’s Ethical Theory:  
 
 
 
[Kant] opposes the “catechistic” method, which tests only the pupil’s 
memory, and favors the “erotectic” (Socratic) method, which develops the 
pupils own reason…Kant’s Enlightenment view is that the principle of 
morality is an idea each of us possesses in our reason. This idea starkly 
opposes much of the human conduct around us, including the customs and 
traditions of our societies, and therefore the habits, feelings, and 
perceptions that have been trained into us. Abstract reasoning has the 
advantage over particular perceptions and feelings that the self-alienation 
involved in it serves to protect us against the prejudices and self-
deceptions that present themselves to us as self-evident moral truths when 
they take the form of immediate feelings and perceptions.111  
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Wood concludes that if our social relationships and institutions enhanced our moral 
wellbeing, then one could rely on our interactions with others to develop our moral 
principles. However, since the opposite is true and people within society are in incessant 
opposition, one must rely on the principles obtained through abstract reasoning.    
 This depiction opposes the normative role Aristotle ascribes to education as well 
as the role, which the community’s divers social forces play in our development. As 
Woods stated, Kant favors the Socratic Method in developing virtue in others. This 
preference most likely occurs for two reasons. Firstly, community influences, e.g. 
socially-based identities, are empirically grounded. Hence, from the community one 
could internalize, at best, moral precepts, which would not necessarily ensure that others 
are treated as ends-in-themselves. Secondly, if one engages others analogously to how 
Socrates, for example, engaged Lysis, then one can develop another person’s 
understanding of the world. This does not necessarily occur through the community 
where inferior behaviors permeate. Thus, for Kant, since one has a duty to one’s friend to 
correct that person’s judgment when that person is in error, the best source of one’s 
ability to do so would be through rational means, which originate in the faculty of 
thought.  
 As mentioned, while Kant viewed himself as having a similar project to Aristotle, 
he disagreed with how Aristotle posited a conception of the categories, which originated 
in an external source. Kant disagrees with Aristotle’s understanding of the community 
based upon the same reasoning. For Kant, the community is not the whole and its 
constituent parts. Instead, it is the parts and the whole it subsumes. Normativity for Kant 
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derives from within. Hence, even though one is influenced by what is occurring in the 
sensible world, for instance, our life plan to attain happiness, our understanding of the 
moral law is more critical to our character. Thus, the following section will discuss the 
nature of that virtuous character. This understanding should enable us to not only better 
grasp our relationship to the moral community, but it will answer the objection in the 
beginning of the section of whether or not disharmony exists in Kant’s ethical theory.  
4.2.2 Practical Reason 
In a similar fashion as the Greeks, Kant proffers a teleological ethical theory. 
However, instead of positing happiness as one’s ultimate good, he insisted upon 
something more objective, something more rational—something a priori. So, Kant 
maintained that while happiness was a good, it was not the good. Thus, Kant created two 
forms of imperative to construct two sets of principles to aim at two different kinds of 
ends. On the one hand, there is happiness, which is material and based upon the faculty 
of desire. On the other hand, there is holiness, which one only attains through the duties 
dictated by the categorical imperative. Thus, while the former coincides, in a sense, with 
the law of nature, and thus, conditioned theoretical principles, the latter exists as a priori 
laws—the ultimate law, which one is to understand through reason’s employment. 
Therefore, even though Kant incorporates happiness, as espoused by the Greeks, he 
diminishes its importance in comparison to the moral law. 
 Through the categories of freedom, one is able to use pure practical reason to 
formulate judgments concerning which actions are good, and which are evil. As Kant 
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defines it, the will is “the practical use of our pure reason.”112 And, as space and time are 
conditions through which one understands objects of the sensible world, freedom is the 
condition, which enables us to “encounter” the moral law. Through our understanding of 
the moral law, one is able to aspire towards holiness where God and immortality are 
“conditions of the necessary object of a will determined by that law.”113  
 From our development of maxims we employ our pure will and aspire to develop 
a holy will, which coincides perfectly with the moral law, i.e. we strive for a will 
“incapable of any maxims which conflict with the moral law.”114 The continuous, 
unending progress of developing our maxims through our desire to attain a holy will is 
what Kant considers virtuous.115 To Kant, one has a duty to oneself to cultivate one’s 
natural powers not for the purposes of one’s natural needs but to enhance one’s 
capacities.116 Hence, like happiness, holiness is something the virtuous person genuinely 
desires to attain. In this sense, the duties derived from our understanding of the moral 
law and which enable us to successfully strive towards holiness are teleological, and 
consequently, the more complete our understanding of the moral law becomes; the more 
our will correlates to its principles. Ergo, for the virtuous person, the moral law becomes 
like a second nature. The following example illustrates this idea.  
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4.2.3 The Addict  
 With respect to Kant, one could categorize one’s pursuit of the moral life as 
analogous to one’s attempt to overcome an addiction.117 Once developed, addictions 
become permanent parts of one’s existence; hence, even if one ends one’s participation 
in its practices, or behaviors, life after cessation is never the same as before the 
addiction’s development. While the days after cessation usually become easier, one must 
develop coping mechanisms in order to maintain one’s sobriety. In this sense, life after 
cessation becomes like a second nature.   
Furthermore, it takes tremendous willpower to overcome an addiction. Hence, 
one’s ability to rationalize why one does not want to continue the substance or behavior 
to which one has become accustomed is integral. In fact, one’s ability to maintain focus 
on sobriety is oftentimes hindered by addictive reasoning, which justifies courses of 
action that can quickly counter one’s progress. For this reason, recovering addicts have 
buddies—sponsors—to help keep them straight. Kant, likewise, has the categorical 
imperative and friendship. For Kant, if one follows the categorical imperative one can 
gain greater acumen concerning the moral law, which can enable one to overcome one’s 
empirical desires. 
  Through the categorical imperative one can use one’s will to overpower desire. 
Though, like with addictions, one’s empirical nature can tempt one to perform actions, 
which are conducive to a “less desirable” existence. For example, the recovering 
alcoholic requires willpower not to “slip” when certain behaviors or events might trigger 
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withdrawal and possible relapse. The ability to endure through the initial misery enables 
behavior modification over a period of time where the reliance upon the substance or 
behavior begins to fade and is replaced by other activities, for instance, healthy eating 
habits and exercise.   
Eventually, one’s life transforms to the point where life without the presence of 
addictive behaviors becomes second nature just as one whose will corresponds to the 
moral law. In this sense, one must want to quit; want to live a “better life”; and, one must 
continuously maintain the will to overcome vulnerable moments. In other words, if one 
equates the maintenance behaviors of overcoming an addiction to duties with respect to 
the moral law (in both cases, one could consider those behaviors virtuous), then any 
action performed towards the pursuit of that goal, e.g. holiness or freedom from 
addiction, will be genuinely desired by that person. Therefore, even if the behavior 
towards which one has a duty does not provide empirical gratification, it leads to a 
greater fulfillment if one views that action with respect to the bigger picture.  
4.3 Kant’s Theory of Friendship 
In his lecture on “The Ethical Systems of the Ancients,” Kant argues: “the 
ancients had no conception of any higher moral perfection than such as could emanate 
from human nature. But as human nature is very imperfect, their ethical principles were 
imperfect. Thus their system of ethics was not pure; it accommodated virtue to man’s 
weakness, and was, therefore, incomplete.”118 The Greeks, of course, did not have a 
concept of practical reason analogous to Kant, nor did they have a similar perspective on 
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God. Hence, as shown, their ethics were empirically based in Kant’s view, which for 
Kant made their pursuits of the good life problematic. If one recalls, Kant believes the 
empirical is based on desires, which are conditioned, contingent, and subjective. 
Therefore, actions performed using the faculty of desire, will always be inferior to those 
performed with awareness of and conjunction to the moral law.  
 Nevertheless, despite this critique of the Greeks, Kant was greatly influenced by 
them. As the previous sections have shown and the following section will show, even 
though Kant creates a realm of moral understanding that superseded the Greeks’ 
empirical conception of virtue, many of the ways in which his ideas are structured; in 
other words, the schematic he uses to frame his theory of friendship will be laden with 
Platonism and Aristotelianism (for example, as mentioned above Kant entwines Plato’s 
Theory of Ideas and Aristotle’s categories). As Louden noted, this relationship is usually 
downplayed by critics, especially virtue ethicists; however, when one acknowledges the 
existence and importance of friendship within Kant’s ethical theory, primarily, his 
anthropology, Kant’s relationship to the Greeks becomes more pronounced. As such, the 
following section will establish the foundation for that connection.    
4.3.1 The Origins of Friendship 
 Aristotle argued that friendship originates from one’s expression of good will 
towards another.119 For Aristotle, it is a ‘kindly feeling’ that occurs through good people 
concerning character-based friendship and although it is not friendship, itself, it provides 
the necessary foundation on which friendship can flourish. Through the reciprocation of 
                                                 
119
 Aristotle, Nichomachean Ethics, trans. Terrence Irwin, 1167a4.  Aristotle, Eudemian Ethics, trans. 
Horace Rackham, 1241a1-20.  
 78
good will, good people become accustomed to one another, thus attaining the necessary 
comfort and developing the necessary confidence so that those involved in the newly 
formed acquaintance can grow to know each other and, therefore, themselves over time. 
As Aristotle notes in the Nicomachean Ethics, good will does not pertain to loving; it 
lacks both intensity and desire.120 However, even though good will does not exude the 
properties of love, as described by Aristotle, the genuine desire to do ‘good’ for the sake 
of doing ‘good’ is essential to the best representations of friendship.121 Kant proffers a 
similar position.   
 For Kant, friendship germinates in the exchange of ‘kindly feelings’ too. As 
expressed by Wood, reciprocal benevolence is “The ground of friendship [and]… always 
the general or philanthropic love that we rationally feel for every human being as a 
rational nature. This is a benevolence (Wohlwollen) grounded on the well-pleasedness 
(Wohgefallen) we experience in the dignity of the other’s rational nature as an end in 
itself”122 Through this reciprocation, one develops trust in one’s friend, and over time the 
reciprocation of benevolence facilitates genuine love to develop. This love invokes 
within friends the desire to disclose their selves to their friends. Though, according to 
Kant, this feeling is usually counterweighted by one’s awareness that if one discloses too 
much, then the friendship will wane. In this respect, friendships are always in a struggle 
for equilibrium. 
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 In this vein, absolute equality in friendship is an ideal towards which one strives. 
In fact, Kant uses an Aristotelian framework to explicate this particular facet of his 
theory, for as one might recall, Aristotle posits three types of friendship, which can exist 
in equality or superiority. Like Aristotle, Kant’s ideals of friendship possess the same 
dynamics. Kant applies the concepts of superiority and equality to friendship 
analogously to Aristotle. Contrary to Aristotle, however, he maintains that although one 
always strives for equality, one person is always, at least slightly, superior to the other, 
i.e. equality can never be achieved.  
4.3.2 The Types of Friendship  
 Kant’s three ideals of friendship are similar to Aristotle’s three types. Though, 
instead of pleasure, utility, and character as the ways in which friendship can primarily 
manifest, Kant maintains that friendships form based upon need, taste, and disposition or 
sentiment. According to Kant, “[friendship] is an aid in overcoming the constraint and 
the distrust man feels in his intercourse with others, by revealing himself to them without 
reserve.123 To Kant, we find refuge in our “communion” with others. Hence, as Kant 
argues, we have a duty not only to ourselves but to others to be social and develop 
friendships. We must form “an all-inclusive circle of those who, in their disposition, are 
citizens of the world – not exactly in order to promote as the end what is best for the 
world but only to cultivate what leads indirectly towards this end.”124 However, similar 
to Aristotle, the community of which one is a part will determine the frequency of 
certain types of friendships to emerge. For instance, while the friendship of need is 
                                                 
123
 Immanuel Kant, Lectures on Ethics, p. 206 
124
 Immanuel Kant, Metaphysics of Morals, 6:473 
 80
prevalent among savages, the friendship of disposition or sentiment is more common 
among “civilized” societies.   
   In the Eudemian Ethics, Aristotle describes the utility-based friendship as being 
the most common type of friendship, forming when two people use each other to gain an 
advantage in some way.125 Like the pleasure-based friendship, Aristotle considers this 
form defective; it is incidental and not essential like the character-based type. Hence, 
when the mutually reciprocated advantage ceases for one or both parties, i.e. equality 
becomes gravely imbalanced, the friendship terminates. This feature is shared by the 
friendship of pleasure. Both are unstable, for both will change with circumstances 
similarly to the pleasure-based friendship, which disintegrates frequently from the fickle 
whims of the involved parties. Hence, for Aristotle, the enduring friendship is the 
character-based, which, as mentioned, originates in reciprocated good will and allows 
for those participating in the friendship to share in activities, e.g. contemplation, that will 
enable both to strive towards eudaimonia. 
 As mentioned, the state of the community influences the prevalence of certain 
types of friendships. In the lowliest of natural conditions there exists the friendship of 
need. This type of friendship is more specific in Kant’s theory than Aristotle, for in 
Kant’s theory, the need-based friendship is characterized by helping others attain basic 
life needs. The hunting party, for example, illustrates the basic idea of this form of 
friendship interaction. In a hunting party, hunters group together for the procurement of 
food. Over time, as the community develops and moves away from barbarism to a more 
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cultured society, this type of friendship is needed less, for societal advancement has 
enabled people to care for their own needs.126    
The occurrence of Kant’s need-based friendship declines as the community 
evolves, for when the community evolves, its members become capable of handling their 
own affairs; they gain a level of self-sufficiency, for instance, community members can 
now provide for themselves and for their families. Thus, if one cannot attain a basic level 
of self-sufficiency, then one becomes a beneficiary to others; one admits need. 
Admitting need is not something, which is acceptable to Kant. Hence, “no true man will 
importune a friend with his troubles; he will rather bear them himself than worry his 
friend with them. If, therefore, the friendship is noble on both sides, neither friend will 
impose his worries upon the other.”127  
The friendship of need is presupposed in every friendship, not for enjoyment, but 
for confidence.”128 This confidence, of which Kant speaks—the belief that the friend 
will care for them as they care for themselves—is a sacred pact, which can only be 
assumed and not asked to be proven. Hence, for Kant, friendship is not a trivial matter. It 
is the mechanism that intertwines as well as shares a common end to the ethical 
community.129  
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 According to Kant, the friendship of disposition, or sentiment, is both pure and 
genuine “in the absolute sense.”130 Like Aristotle’s character-based friendship, it does 
not occur often; however, unlike Aristotle whose model endeavors towards human 
excellence, Kant’s conception strives towards intimacy. Ergo, the participants involved 
in the friendship of disposition, or sentiment, seek to fully disclose not only their 
dispositions but their judgments. This way, friends can lovingly correct each other’s 
judgments when they are in error so that they can achieve a happier, more fulfilled life. 
This notion is analogous to Aristotle who espoused that friends mould each other in one 
another’s image. Contrary to Aristotle, though, Kant explains that because of our 
‘frailties’, we do not fully disclose ourselves to even our closest friends.131  Thus, even 
though we desire to share ourselves completely with someone and aspire towards a 
niveau de la communion parfaite, our respect for our friend overcomes the love that 
seeks to bind us, preventing us from reaching the level of intimacy for which we yearn. 
 Like Plato, Kant distinguishes between a relationship established for the pursuit 
of basic goods and one that desires the higher form. Thus far this section has discussed 
the progression from the former to the latter. However, like Plato, Kant proffers an 
analogue relationship. While Plato considered this analogue a relationship based upon 
erotic pursuits (and consequently bad), Kant establishes it as a relationship based upon 
taste (and subsequently cultured). Hence, Kant’s friendship of taste, with this 
understanding, becomes more of a pseudo-friendship.   
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 For Aristotle, the pleasure-based friendship commonly exists among the youth, 
pertaining on many occasions to erotic love (similar to Plato). However, this type of 
friendship involves myriad other activities from which friends derive pleasure, e.g. 
drinking, playing sports, and shopping. Conversely, Kant’s friendship of taste lacks this 
multiplicity of activities. In fact, while Aristotle focuses on the feelings of those 
involved, Kant centers his conception on entertainment, more specifically, on social 
situations where those involved possess something the other lacks, i.e. the businessman 
and the scholar can converse on a variety of topics “provided the scholar is not a pedant 
and the business-man not a blockhead.”132 In this sense, Kant encourages diversity, 
maintaining that variety is paramount.  
 As suggested by Marcucci, this aversion to ‘like’ befriending ‘like’, i.e. a scholar 
befriending a scholar, probably arose from feuds Kant had with other academics, such as 
Johann August Eberhand who condemned Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason as the 
“Leibnizian Critique of Pure Reason.”133 Hence, as Marcucci explains, while Kant 
would battle with other philosophers, he would dine with people representing an array of 
vocations and social positions such as “the criminalist Jensch, the secret councilor von 
Hippel, the government councilor Vigilantius, and the parish priest Sommer”134 
Therefore, when trying to grasp Kant’s friendship of taste, one must remember that 
“[Kant] had neither life nor history. He led a mechanical, regular, almost abstract 
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bachelor existence in a little retired street of Konigsberg, an old town in the north-
eastern frontier of Germany.”135  
Based on this excerpt, it is difficult to imagine Kant embracing the hedonism 
involved in Greek tales such as Plato’s Symposium, especially since standards of 
decency had evolved eliminating certain practices, e.g. pedophilia, from both social and 
moral norms. Consequently, we must assume that the friendship of taste concerns those 
jovial lunches that Kant hosted and not the feeling-based activities espoused by both 
Aristotle and Plato.  
4.4 The Second Self Problem 
The last section discussed Aristotle’s understanding of self-love and how it 
relates to friendship. According to Aristotle, good friends are like a second self. Hence, 
one can gauge the quality of one’s action regarding one’s friend based upon whether or 
not that action would facilitate one’s own eudaimonia. Furthermore, because one loves 
oneself and because one’s good friend is a second self, then one loves one’s friend as 
one loves oneself. In this sense, one loves one’s friend for the sake of that friend because 
that friend possesses a character, which is analogous to one’s own.  
 Aristotle believed there was a commonality among the virtuous because various 
normative forces shaped them in a similar way. According to Kant, since the universal 
moral law is the same for everyone and since moral agents through the employment of 
reason will deduce the same laws through the application of the categorical imperative, 
then the moral law will possess a similar function as the political community (with 
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respect to normativity) does for Aristotle. Therefore, like Aristotle, those who Kant 
would describe as virtuous would possess a commonality with respect to their character. 
 The difference between Aristotle and Kant, however, is that good Kantians will 
perform an action for the sake of duty and good Aristotelians will do so for the sake of 
the individual agent. Thus, while Louden is correct in that virtue ethicists downplay the 
importance of the cultivation of virtue in Kant’s ethics and its role with respect to moral 
agents, virtue ethicists, e.g. Stocker, are partially correct in their critique that there is a 
“moral schizophrenia” possible within Kant’s theory and that this bifurcation of 
motivation and reason can be problematic. For example, earlier this section discussed 
how being honest under all circumstances is mandated by the moral law. The following 
two thought experiments will show how this can be problematic not only for the 
decision-maker but for Kant’s theory.  
4.4.1 The Friend’s Dilemma 
 There are ten soldiers in a prison camp. The captors only have resources to 
support five, and furthermore, five prisoners are sufficient collateral for the captors’ 
needs (with respect to the “enemy”). Hence, they devise a game to eliminate five of the 
prisoners they have just captured. The rules go as follows. There are three prisoners: A, 
B, C. Prisoner A is asked a question. If she answers correctly, then prisoner B is 
immediately shot. If he answers incorrectly, then prisoner C is immediately shot. 
Further, prisoner A is immediately shot if he fails to answer the question at all. The 
captors decided that when there are five prisoners left the game is over.  
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 Prisoner A is asked the question: ‘What is the official language of Cambodia?’ 
Prisoner A knows the answer to this question; it’s Khmer. The following issue arises. 
Prisoner B is prisoner A’s best friend from the platoon. In fact, not only had prisoner B 
saved prisoner A’s life but prisoner A and prisoner B had decided to open a business 
together upon their return home. On the other hand, prisoner C is one of the worst 
human beings Prisoner A had ever met. His incompetence while on guard duty enabled 
the soldiers to be captured in the first place. What should prisoner A do?  
 If prisoner A decides not to answer the question, then he would die. While Kant 
would permit self-sacrifice in certain circumstances, for instance, for the preservation of 
the moral law, this would not likely be one of those situations, because not answering the 
question in this particular situation would be one not desiring not to make a difficult 
decision. Furthermore, the reason why the decision would be difficult would be 
empirically-based, which is what the categorical imperative was designed to overcome. 
On the other hand, if prisoner A answers the question, he will not desire to do so 
truthfully because that decision would cause the death of his good friend. This decision, 
however, would violate one’s perfect duty to others, which supersedes any duty one has 
to one’s friend. Therefore, according to Kant’s ethics, prisoner A must answer correctly. 
This course of action, though, will result in the death of a good friend over a wanton.  
 For Kant, human beings are all ends-in-themselves. Hence, with respect to our 
duties to ourselves and to others, each person should have equal consideration because 
one’s decision is based upon objective laws provided by our understanding of the moral 
law. Thus, variables such as towards the person whom the action is directed (for 
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example, one will possess different feelings for a friend as opposed to a stranger), and 
the effects of that action are irrelevant to the decision-making process if one desires to be 
holy (for instance, one may be required to adversely affect the friend for the sake of duty 
to the stranger). If this belief is true, then what effect does this have on friendship? What 
value do our friendships possess?  
First off, one has an imperfect duty to oneself to develop one’s abilities. 
Secondly, one has a duty to involve oneself in friendships as well as correct the 
judgments of one’s friends. Thus, with respect to cultivating virtues, Kant’s conception 
of friendship has a similar function to Aristotle and Plato. In this sense, not only does 
our understanding of the moral law provide normative force to our actions, but our 
knowledge of the moral law requires us to develop the understanding of our friends in 
the community. In this regard, friends assist one another in becoming better human 
beings and help the community, as a whole, strive towards its rationally perceived ideal. 
Broadly speaking, friends provide support when one is in need; they are persons whom 
one can trust and respect; and, they are persons to whom, because of that trust and 
respect, one can disclose oneself. Therefore, friends enable intimacy and development. 
Though, that intimacy and that development concerns what it takes to develop oneself 
and one’s understanding of the moral law, which are independent of the circumstances, 
in which that law must be executed. This point raises another issue and inspires the 
second thought experiment, which is similar to the first. Is Kant’s philosophy truly other-
regarding?  
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With respect to duty, Kant’s philosophy is other-regarding, for people genuinely 
desire to do what is best for others for duty’s sake. In this sense, there are many parallels 
between Aristotle’s sense of other-regard and Kant’s. For example, both Aristotle and 
Kant will treat the other as a second self; furthermore, both will permit (and sometimes 
require) self-sacrifice on behalf of virtue; also, both will posit conceptions of friends as 
those who realize themselves in each other; and lastly, Kant, like Aristotle, will present a 
conception of the “good life”. While Aristotle prizes eudaimonia, Kant maintains 
holiness as the ideal towards which one should endeavor. Therefore, it would appear that 
even Kant’s deontological ideas have virtue ethical undertones.  Nevertheless, despite 
these similarities, Kant views self-love as being empirical, and thus, a vehicle of 
potentially base actions whereas, for Aristotle, the good form of self-love is what enables 
us to become the virtuous individuals capable of genuinely acting on behalf of others. 
Thus, to answer the question raised earlier concerning Stocker’s criticism. While there is 
no schizophrenia concerning Kant’s theory when one performs an action for the sake of 
duty, for one genuinely desires to perform that action, Kant’s ethics are schizophrenic 
when agents are concerned. Because Kant’s ethics require one to make decisions for 
duty’s sake and not for the agent’s, there is a “disconnect” between reason and 
motivation, which can be problematic depending on how one takes this discrepancy.  
4.5 A Final Word  
 The aim of this section was to demonstrate Kant’s similarities to the Greeks—
similarities which are often overlooked by critics, for example, Kant does value the lives 
of moral agents. His distrust of humanity in its natural state could be why he sought 
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wholeness in the divine, for through reason one could find a moral law that could 
objectively guide one’s actions so that others would not be harmed by one’s empirical 
pursuit of happiness. This issue was Kant’s primary concern with the Greeks. It was not 
that they desired ‘the good life’ but that the good life that they desired had limitations 
because those who aspired towards it had limitations. Hence, human beings required a 
normative foundation, which was not empirically flawed to guide us.  
While I am not a Kantian, it is not difficult to appreciate what Kant’s moral 
project entailed. Though, despite the aesthetic appreciation I have for his arguments, as 
the thought experiment showed, Kant’s theory of friendship was problematic in one 
sense. As shown above, genuineness in friendship was an issue because if friendships as 
well as the actions of its participants are shrouded in various duties, then the interests of 
the individuals within the friendships can be ignored and subsequently, force decisions 
that no human being would desire to make and which would cause severe psychological 
issues. Nevertheless, even thought Kant may devalue facets of our being such as 
identity, it does not mean that his project as a whole is a failure—far from it.136 Today, 
many philosophers are working with Kant’s ideas to produce fascinating innovations, 
which no doubt facilitate philosophy’s progression. In this light, Kant’s influence will 
remain among us as an integral part of our intellectual tradition.   
 
 
                                                 
136
 Christine M. Korsgaard, The Sources of Normativity, ed. Onora O’Neil (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 100-01. In this particular work, Korsgaard uses Kant to address this issue and frames her 
conception of normativity in practical identities formed through community interaction.   
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5. CONCLUSION 
 
The aim of this thesis was to show the evolution of a certain conception of 
friendship held by three philosophers integral to the Western philosophical tradition. 
This conception began in Plato’s Lysis, proliferated in Aristotle’s ethical theory, and 
then appeared in Kant’s moral philosophy later. Though, unlike Plato and Aristotle, 
Kant’s theory of friendship as shown in the last section does not allow for other-
regarding actions to occur in the same sense as they do in both Plato’s and Aristotle’s 
respective ethical theories. The following section will recount the development of this 
argument in more detail.  
5.1 Plato’s Lysis 
 Plato’s Lysis is where the conception of friendship explored in this thesis was 
originally established. Though, Plato’s ideas concerning friendship have remained 
unexamined by contemporary scholarship. So, the first section endeavored to explore 
and then speculate what this theory most likely entailed. In order to begin this analysis, 
the relationship between Socrates and Hermes required explanation. 
 If one recalls, Hermes was the patron god to many Ancient Greeks. Concerning 
this particular dialogue, Hermes was the patron deity to wayfarers and he was the god of 
gymnastic sports. While the latter connection was not explored in depth, the former was. 
The presence of the Hermes-Socrates connection enabled the extrapolation of a model of 
friendship based upon the dialogue’s dramatic subtext.  
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 In the text, Socrates proffered a model of friendship which mirrored the 
dialogue’s dramatic activity. While in the dialogue this model was debunked through 
Socrates’ elenchus, the version presented in the subtext was not. In fact, this is what led 
to Socrates’ closing remarks where he stated that while they could not determine what 
friendship was, it would appear to others that they were friends.  
 The model proffered in the Lysis states that people befriend others for the sake of 
the good on behalf of the bad. In other words, people seek intermediaries to help each 
other become self-sufficient. As the dialogue showed, while the good could become self-
sufficient in certain ways such as health and wealth, this does not necessitate that they 
become self-sufficient in every way. For instance, since Socrates is the wisest man in 
Athens and he does not view himself as possessing divine wisdom, then neither the boys 
or any other citizen of Athens were divinely wise as well. As such, people are always 
dependent upon one another to partake in philosophical activity to become wiser. Since 
even those who “lose” in discourses gain wisdom by the activity, philosophical activity 
is the most important activity in which one can participate. And, through this activity, 
Plato will insinuate, true friendship occurs.  
 Through this understanding, the dialogue suggests that Socrates is the 
intermediary, Lysis and Menexenus are neither good nor bad (who seek the good on 
account of the bad), and Hippothales remains bad despite Socrates’ demonstration. 
Furthermore, the interactions among these interlocutors suggest many different types of 
relationships. There is the parent-child, the citizen-slave, the erotic, the basic goods, the 
higher goods, and civic. Only the last three are considered friendships. While the basic 
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goods friendship is neutral, the higher goods friendship is virtuous. Moreover, the civic 
friendship exhibited by Socrates reveals an other-regard concerning one’s actions. This 
observation is of paramount importance, for it is through this type of friendship where 
Socrates escapes egoism.   
5.2 Aristotle’s Expansion 
 As mentioned in the third section, Aristotle believed that friendship is the 
community. Normative forces arising from all facets of the political community shape us 
as we develop. First, there is the ruler who along with the legislators establishes laws 
which create an environment where its citizens can prosper and successfully endeavor to 
become eudaimôn. Then, there are people in various communities extant within the 
political community who shape the behavior of each other. Next, there is the household 
which influences the development of, for instance, children, thus molding them into 
virtuous adults. After that, there is virtue which guides one’s behavior. This, of course, 
germinates from one’s desire to become eudaimôn. This desire, however, is determined 
by social influences. In this sense, as section three showed, Aristotle’s conception of the 
political community is cyclical and his theory of friendship is polymorphic, for all of the 
normative dynamics just discussed involve different forms of friendship.  
 Unlike Plato who presented different ways relationships exist, Aristotle describes 
those relationships as friendship. Hence, the just ruler befriends her subjects, citizens 
befriend one another through civic friendships, and fathers rule the household and 
demonstrate a form of friendship to kin within the household just as those within the 
household befriend the father. Those within the household, furthermore, befriend those 
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within the community where individuals befriend each other through three types of 
friendship: pleasure-based, utility-based, and character-based. 
 As the end of the section showed, the pleasure-based and the utility-based 
friendship are both incomplete versions of the primary, complete, true form of 
friendship—the character-based. However, this reading of friendship is not held by 
everyone. In fact, one could argue that Kant held a slightly different view, which 
fundamentally influenced his conception of friendship. In this view, character-based 
friendship and the primary form would not be identical; they would be related. While 
this difference may not seem significant at first, its implications would redefine the way 
which one interprets Aristotle, for if one views Aristotle’s perspective this way, then one 
would most likely believe that Aristotle did not believe true friends exist. This opinion, 
of course, was espoused by Kant in the Metaphysics of Morals where he defined true 
friendship as an absolute equality where respect and disclosure are in equilibrium.  
5.3 Kant’s Theory of Friendship  
 As stated in section 4, Kant believed that friendship was an idea towards which 
one had a duty to strive. Furthermore, we have a duty to others to help them strive for 
this goal as well. In this respect Kant resembled virtue ethicists. While this 
understanding of Kant is not commonly held, section 4 maintained that Kant’s ethical 
theory mirrored Aristotle in that it posited a conception of the good life; it offered 
instructions and means of striving for that end-goal. Also, it contained three ideals of 
friendship as well as an analogous view as Aristotle’s concerning self-love except that, 
for Kant, the friend is like a second self because that person is noumenal. In other words, 
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because the friend is an end-in-itself and because the rational moral law is what 
generates and determines virtuous actions in Kant’s ethical theory, the friend as a 
noumenal self is the same as the person performing the action.  
 Like Aristotle, Kant had three types of friendship. The first was the friendship of 
need. This type of friendship, while being assumed in the friendship of disposition or 
sentiment as well as taste, is most prevalent among primitive human beings who rely on 
one another for basic needs. As the community evolves and becomes more cultured, 
people are capable of taking care of their own needs. Hence, this type of friendship is no 
longer needed. Instead, the friendship of taste, which pertains to socialization, and the 
friendship of disposition or sentiment become more prevalent among people. 
Furthermore, like Aristotle, Kant believes that the friendship of disposition or sentiment 
is the rare and exhibited by few within society. Hence, while Kant’s conception is 
similar to Aristotle’s and Plato’s in certain respects, it does possess its unique identity. 
One way this is done is through Kant’s idea of other-regard.  
 For Aristotle and Plato, other-regard concerned moral agents. One acted on 
behalf of another for the sake of that person. Kant, on the other hand, posits a different 
conception. For Kant, one acts on behalf of duty. Hence, one no longer acts on behalf of 
the other person. Instead, acts on behalf of the actions that duty allows. Thus, there is a 
disconnection between reason and motivation in this regard. This causes a lack of 
genuineness to emerge, though, not in the sense that many would critique Kant for. For 
example, some critique Kant as having a disconnection between reason and motivation 
for actions alone. However, as section 4 showed, this was not the case. When one acts 
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utilizing the moral law as the basis for one’s action, one genuinely wants to perform the 
action, however, as I just mentioned, this is not for the sake of the person. The genuine 
desire to perform the action is for the sake of duty, which is different. And, depending 
upon who one talks to is, consequently, problematic.  As such, while Kant’s theory adds 
a humanistic quality to friendship in that it incorporates our needs for respect and self-
disclosure, it lacks arguably one of the most integral facets of friendship, which is the 
desire to help another not for the sake of any particular duty but because that person is 
one with whom one forms a bond—an alliance; an implicit agreement to help one’s 
friend not for the sake of any duty, but for the sake of one’s friend. In this sense, Kant’s 
theory lacks an essential quality that both Plato and Aristotle possessed.        
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